From the Very First Days of the War to Victory Day

“What even the most seasoned German saboteurs from the Brandenburg-800 regiment failed to do, the Soviet security officers did: they shot the entire top of the Western Front at once. Yes, the Germans did not even dream of such luck: is it a joke, to get into the headquarters of the Western Front and there shoot the commander, the chief of staff, his closest deputies in the branches of service, the commander of the 4th Army… You can die for your Motherland not only at the front in a trench, but also in the rear — in the basement of the NKVD.”

(From the Internet)

“Strengthen a rag with a stick, and many will say that it is a banner.”

Stanislav Jerzy Lec

***

It took me a long time to write this story. It was compiled from surviving documents, memories, and scattered family stories.

It was important for me to finish it by Victory Day. After all, for us it is “joy with tears in our eyes.”

These days we usually remember Berlin, the flag over the Reichstag.

But I would like to remember how it all began, this whole road to the heart of Germany. Remember the feat of those who made their incredible contribution to the Victory by taking the battle on the border. Remember those who bravely defended themselves, despite the fact that they were shot in the back, and that one wave after another of fascist invaders rolled over them.

Yes, the battle was unequal. But our fighters gave a worthy rebuff and fought to the death. They died, and thereby gave life to us, their descendants.

I also wanted to talk about those who “sent them to death with an unwavering hand,” not fully understanding and controlling the situation. About those who tried to make up for lost time in peacetime, without taking their lives into account. About those who threw them into senseless counterattacks in the first days of the war, without understanding the situation, introducing even greater chaos and confusion, tearing them apart, scattering them, depriving them of their last chance.

However, for their sluggishness and lack of proper initiative, they paid in full — with their lives. They were shot for a cause, but for show, as an edification to others.

Of course, they made terrible mistakes that cost a lot of blood. But let’s give them their due — they did not give up like Vlasov, did not become traitors, but continued to fight to the best of their strength and capabilities.

Of course, they understood what awaited them in the end, but did not become defectors.

And this article is about them too.

Take a look at the photographs, here they are in front of you — still alive, full of strength and hope.

War looms on the horizon, but for now there is a peaceful sky above everyone.

Back in 1941, border intelligence played a huge role in establishing the exact date and even time of Germany’s attack on the USSR. Between June 11 and June 21, she was able to do this about a dozen times. This information, according to instructions, was sent to both the army command and military intelligence.

Thus, the reports of the 17th Red Banner Brest Border Detachment of the NKVD troops went directly to the commander of the 4th Army, Major General Aleksandr Korobkov.

Who was this general?

He was born on June 20, 1897 (according to some sources — 1898) in the family of a wealthy peasant. His father even had his own mill. In addition to Alexander, the eldest, there were two more sons and a daughter in the family. He received his primary education at a 4-grade city school. In 1915, Korobkov joined the active army as a volunteer. A year later he graduated from the Orenburg infantry warrant officer training school and was sent to the 134th reserve rifle regiment. He stayed there until the February Revolution. During February, he distinguished himself by actively participating in the search and arrests of former police officers, for which he was chosen as assistant chief of police in Petrovsk. Once, during the requisition of weapons from the landowners of Petrovsky district, a delegation from the peasants came to him. They complained about their landowner — they say. does not let them live in peace, does not want to share. Without hesitation, slashing with his palm, Comrade Korobkov personally immediately gave them the landowner’s land. But the time for such radical decisions had not yet come, so he was first arrested for arbitrariness, and then sent to the Southwestern Front with the marching company of the 432nd Valdai Infantry Regiment.

Arriving at the place, together with the regimental committee, Alexander began to campaign against the Provisional Government and the “war to the bitter end.” After October, the 432nd Valdai Regiment almost in full force joined the Red Army.

In October 1918, near Syzran, the company commander Korobkov was wounded and captured. He was saved from execution by some Czech orderly who sympathized with the Bolsheviks. Alexander fled to Buguruslan, where units of the Red Army soon entered. For courage and bravery on the fronts of the Civil War, Korobkov was presented with the Order of the Red Banner of Battle, awarded a personalized pistol and a certificate of honor.

Next was the military academy (by the way, just under Tukhachevsky), and after its completion — service in Novocherkassk, commander of the 25th rifle regiment of the 9th Don division of the North Caucasus military district.

Little is known about him personally: he loved the forest and fishing. He played the guitar and sang well. He also loved to dance.

In the fall of 1939, General Korobkov was entrusted with commanding the entry of troops into bourgeois Lithuania. For a successful operation in February 1941, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

In May 1941 he was appointed commander of the 4th Army.

Former chief of staff of the 4th Army L.M. Sandalov, in his book “The Experienced,” recalled the arrival of the new commander this way:

“…/Major General Aleksandr Korobkov/ I knew for a long time. He was a very active commander, quickly moving up the ranks and leaving many of his colleagues behind…

The new army commander meticulously carried out the will of the district commander regarding the deployment of troops. He either did not have his own point of view on this subject, or carefully hid it.”

In June, alarming messages began to arrive from border guards. At first they were simply ignored. And on June 20, when Korobkov apparently ran out of patience, a completely outrageous incident occurred.

On this day, the head of the 17th Red Banner Brest Border Detachment, Major Kuznetsov, arrived to report to Army Commander-4. After he objectively reported the situation and made conclusions about a possible German attack, the general ordered him to be taken into custody, although he had no right to do so, accusing him of alarmism and bias. Only the intervention of Moscow, the leadership of the Main Directorate of Police, forced Korobov to release the head of the detachment.

Many years later, Major General of Aviation, and then Colonel Belov, commander of the 10th mixed air division, recalled:

“On June 20, I received a telegram from the chief of staff of the district Air Force, Colonel S.A. Khudyakov with the order of the district air force commander: “Bring the units to combat readiness. Ban the command staff from leaving. Recall those on leave.”

About the order… I reported to the commander of the 4th Army, General Korobkov, who answered me:

— I don’t have such an order.

On the same day I went to see Divisional Commissar Shlykov, a member of the Military Council.

— Comrade Commissiokner, an order has been received from the district air force commander to bring the units into combat readiness. I ask you to insist that the district send the families of the commanding officers.

“We wrote to the district asking for permission to withdraw one division, some warehouses and a hospital from Brest. We were told: “We only allow part of the hospital to be transferred.” So it’s useless to raise this question.”

General Pavlov reacted to all reports in exactly the same way.

Reference.

On January 31, 1938, Pavlov wrote in his autobiography that he was born in 1897 in the Kostroma province into a poor peasant family, graduated from a rural school, then a 2-year college. In 1914, he volunteered to join the tsarist army and served as a private and senior non-commissioned officer. In 1916, he was wounded and captured by the Germans, where he was kept in camps and worked in a factory and in the Mariana-Grube mines. Returned home from captivity on January 1, 1919. He joined the CPSU(b) in November 1919.

Pavlov was mobilized into the Red Army on August 24, 1919. Served in the 56th food battalion in Kostroma.

In March 1920, he was sent to the Southern Front, where he fought against Makhno’s gangs, served in the front inspection, and as commander of a cavalry regiment (Semipalatinsk). In the Altai Mountains he fought against the gangs of Salnikov and Kaygorodov. In 1923, he was transferred to the Turkestan front as the head of a fighter detachment and fought against Turdybai’s gang. In August of the same year, already in Eastern Bukhara, he led operations against the gangs of Ibrahim-bek, Ala-Nazar, Hodman, and Hadji-Ali. Commanded the 75th Cavalry Regiment. In 1929, he took part in battles in Manchuria, in which his “regiment completed all assigned tasks clearly, quickly and energetically.”

In 1931, he was appointed commander of the 6th mechanized regiment, which was stationed in Gomel. “From February 1934 to October 1936, he commanded the 4th separate mechanized brigade (Bobruisk).”

The war in Spain was not supposed to be written openly, so Pavlov was terse about this episode: “From October 1936 to June 1937, he was on a special business trip, where he commanded a brigade and united the command of groups from 11 to 9 brigades with all technical means.” After Spain, the general experienced a dizzying rise: in July 1937, he was appointed deputy, and in December — head of the armored department (ABTU) of the Red Army with the military rank of corps commander. Pavlov was awarded high awards: two Orders of the Red Banner, a diploma from the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, a gold watch, the Order of Lenin, and the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1939, Pavlov took part in hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkin-Gol River, in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. Dmitry Grigorievich wrote about his military education in his autobiography: “He graduated from the Red Army: command staff courses, Higher Military School / Higher Military School. — Yu.Ch./ Siberia — cavalry department, Military Academy named after. Frunze, AKTUS VTA /Academic technical improvement courses at the Military Transport Academy. — Yu.Ch./.”

By his nature, the general did not like conflict situations. He preferred to laugh it off or make excuses.

The future air marshal Alexander Golovanov, shortly before the war, was appointed commander of an air regiment based in ZapOVO and went to introduce himself to the district commander. As the conversation progressed, he decided to call Moscow, Stalin.

“A few minutes later he was already talking to Stalin. From his answers I realized that Stalin was asking counter questions.

– No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, and my reconnaissance is working well. I’ll check it again, but I think it’s just a provocation.

He hung up.

• Stalin is not in a good mood. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border.”

But on June 21, at about 11 p.m., border guards discovered and caught a German saboteur, who during interrogation testified that the offensive should begin on the 22nd at 4:15 a.m.

The same Major Kuznetsov contacted the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the Belarusian SSR, General I.A. Bogdanov and reported that, according to many sources, the Germans would begin their offensive at 4 o’clock in the morning. He asked permission to immediately alert the personnel, but… was refused.

At 24.00 on June 21, Korobkov and Sandalov, and a little later other officers of the army department were called by order of the district chief of staff to the army headquarters, but they did not receive any specific orders other than “to be ready for everyone.”

Upon returning, Korobkov, under his own responsibility, ordered sealed red packets with instructions on the procedure for combat alert to be sent to all formations and individual units.

At 2 o’clock in the morning, reports began to arrive from the detachments that German tanks were approaching the border line and, without waiting for an order, at 03:00 Major Kuznetsov, on his own initiative, gave the order to put all units on combat readiness. Unfortunately, the order did not reach all outposts. As a result, the enemy’s fire preparations caught many by surprise. The families of the border guards did not have time to evacuate, many of whom later ended up in German concentration camps.

Only at 3.30 was Pavlov’s order to bring the troops into combat readiness finally transmitted in clear text by telegraph. He demanded, first of all, to silently withdraw the 42nd Infantry Division from the Brest Fortress “in batches” and bring the 14th Mechanized Corps to combat readiness. Aviation was allowed to be relocated to field airfields.

Before 3.45, Korobkov personally managed to give two orders by phone: the first was for the chief of staff of the 42nd Infantry Division to raise it on alert and move it out of the fortress to the assembly area, the second was for the commander of the 14th Mechanized Corps to put it on combat readiness.

It took three hours to withdraw troops from the fortress. Therefore, not only did they not have time to withdraw them, but even the withdrawal itself did not have time to begin.

They also did not have time to transmit the order to the 14th Mechanized Corps before the start of the enemy’s artillery preparation.

In some areas, the wire communication lines were again disrupted, so the head of the detachment, Major Kuznetsov, in the first minutes of the war was unable to contact either the command of the Red Army formations, or the headquarters of the border troops of the NKVD of the BSSR, or the outposts. As, indeed, did the headquarters of the Western Front, which, having four armies under its command, literally lost contact with them from the first minutes of hostilities. If after two o’clock in the morning wire communication with army headquarters was seriously disrupted, then by morning it completely disappeared.

Desperate, Kuznetsov plainly broadcast on the radio: “Everyone, everyone! Germany began hostilities. The head of the detachment is Major Kuznetsov.”

At 05.25 on June 22, General Pavlov gave his famous order: “In view of the massive military actions that have emerged from the Germans, I order: raise troops and act in a combat manner.”

From the “Official Note of Colonel General L.M. Sandalov to the Head of the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Army General V.V. Kurosawu” dated September 1, 1956:

“…Army General PAVLOV became confused in the difficult situation of the initial period of the war and lost control of the troops.”

The generals were confused, but our soldiers and officers were not confused, who from the first minutes of the war did not run headlong, as some writers claim, but showed miracles of heroism and selflessness.

So, for example, when at 11 o’clock in the morning the Germans, having crossed the Western Bug, entered the village of Sutno, they were met there by 15 border guards who had been sent there in advance by the head of the outpost, Senior Lieutenant K.T. Kichigin. The fighters dispersed in attics, gardens, and vegetable gardens and entered into battle with the infantry battalion that had entered the village.

Sergeant Nikolai Volkov took refuge in a house at a crossroads and destroyed at least twenty Germans with machine gun fire.

By 3 p.m., there were up to a hundred corpses of enemy soldiers on the approaches to the outpost. After such significant losses, the Germans stopped attacks and limited themselves to shelling the outpost.

However, after consulting, the Nazis decided to change tactics. They rounded up the residents of the village of Sutno, took 16 hostages and ordered them to go to the outpost to persuade the border guards to stop resisting and surrender. But the residents refused.

All this was observed by deputy political instructor P.P. Stefanenko, who occupied a position in the attic of the house. He opened fire, killing a German major and several soldiers, but the Germans surrounded the house and literally tore the border guard to pieces. They also shot the hostages…

So the enemy entered our land.

The fight continued unabated. The commander of the 29th Tank Division, Colonel N.P. Studnev, at his own peril and risk, launched a fairly strong counterattack against the advancing enemy. As a result, his units advanced 7–9 kilometers and temporarily stopped the enemy. In the afternoon, the newly arrived Nazi tank units, with powerful air support, launched several counterattacks, but all of them were successfully repulsed.

Near the village of Novoselki, four reinforced border guards under the command of machine gunner Vladimir Ivanovich Chugreev entered into battle with the enemy infantry. For half an hour they disrupted the crossing. Border guards Sergeev and Chugreev were killed in the battle.

They learned about their feat at the outpost from a note found in the collar of a shepherd dog that had returned to its own: “The Germans have brought a large number of troops to the border and are crossing the Bug in two places. We entered the battle. We will fight until the last bullet. Don’t remember sadly. Sergeev.”

Another border guard, Boris Mokrov, in the 1960s, in a conversation with former major and now colonel A. Kuznetsov, recalled this first day: “The war alerted me at 4 o’clock. I took my place in the machine gun crew. Together with a group of fighters led by junior political instructor Plakhotnik, we were on the right flank, and the head of the outpost, Mikhailov, with the crew of machine gunner Petrov, defended the left flank. By 8 o’clock the Germans began to advance along the ravine on the left flank, where we had a shooting range. The head of the outpost ordered not to open fire without his command, and he crawled forward with a light machine gun and grenades. The Germans had already come very close to the place where Mikhailov was lying down, but there was still no command to shoot. And suddenly we heard grenade explosions — then all our weapons started talking.

The attack was repulsed with heavy losses for the Germans. There were several wounded at the outpost. At the suggestion of the junior political instructor, we replenished our arsenal with captured weapons from killed Nazis. The second attack was repelled at 10 am, and the sixth at 10 pm. The wife of the deputy head of the outpost, a fifth-year student at the Moscow Pedagogical Institute, Galya, especially distinguished herself. She arrived at the outpost 20 days before the start of the war and bravely fought with us. There was no contact with the commandant’s office, and soldier Nikolai Gorchakov was sent to Volchin. Returning wounded, he reported that the commandant’s office was occupied by the Germans. And then at midnight the head of the outpost ordered a retreat to Belovezhskaya Pushcha. The wives of the commanders and children, along with the wounded, rode on carts, and we carried machine guns and weapons.

Before reaching the commandant’s office, we met some fighters from other outposts and commandant’s offices. Then, dividing into two groups, they began to break through to their own. The head of the outpost and his group did not go to the appointed meeting place. His wife and two children were with us. Near Belovezhskaya Pushcha we met a major general, I don’t remember his last name. He gave us a car and ordered us to break out of the encirclement, deliver a package to Minsk and report that he remained with part of the troops behind enemy lines. Together with junior sergeant Pashchenko and other soldiers, we completed the task and ended up near Vyazma.”

While our soldiers were fighting and dying, the leadership was confused, panicked and completely lost control. Unfortunately, it was unable to organize a systematic withdrawal and withdrawal of equipment.

Absolutely funny things happened.

Lieutenant General Strelbitsky, who in 1941 was the commander of the 8th Anti-Tank Brigade, recalled that the German pilots in the skies over Lida behaved very impudently, which was strange. They bombed as if in training, without any fear of anti-aircraft fire – and our anti-aircraft guns simply remained silent.

The division commander replied to Colonel Strelbitsky that the day before he had received an order: “Don’t give in to provocation, don’t open fire on the planes.”

The anti-aircraft gunners began to shoot only when the colonel came to them with a pistol in his hand. Four planes were shot down right there. Three captured German pilots stated: they knew about the ban on air defense to open fire.

Lieutenant General Sergei Dolgushin, who then served as a fighter pilot in ZapOVO, said in his interview:

“During the winter of 1941, we mastered high-altitude flights, shot a lot both at the cone and on the ground, and began to fly at night. On May 10th, our regiment was transferred from Lida to the Novy Dvor airfield, just west of Grodno. In the north, the border with the Germans was fifteen kilometers away. As soon as we landed, a fascist Messer flew over the airfield at low altitude. So impudent, he even shook his wings. In clear weather, from a height of two thousand meters we saw a German airfield filled with various vehicles. We drew up a diagram and sent it to headquarters. And on June 21, at six in the evening, having finished the flights, we received an order: to remove cannons, machine guns, and boxes of ammunition from the planes and store it all in a warehouse.

…Everyone was perplexed then, tried to find out what was the matter, but they explained to us: this was an order from the commander of the district troops, and orders are not discussed in the army.”

According to him, in the pre-war days, as if by order, repairs of the base airfield in the city of Lida began, spare sites were not prepared, and the number of mechanics and gunsmiths was reduced to one per link. As a result, the pilots had to personally install the removed guns in the wings of the fighters, and although the alarm was announced in the regiment at 02.30 on June 22, the planes began to take off only at 06.30-07.00, and before that the Germans had flown over the airfield to bomb without any opposition.

As a result, 738 aircraft were lost on the first day of the war.

At the same time, due to confusion, rifle units were forced to engage in battle with enemy tank armadas without artillery support.

Moreover, for the construction of border fortified areas, the People’s Commissar of Defense allowed the border armies to allocate a battalion from each regiment for earthworks.

Of course, they were not recalled from work in time, as a result of which more than 80 thousand soldiers and officers met the Germans unarmed. Many of them died or were wounded, others scattered through the forests and were captured.

For the counterattack, Pavlov allocated the 11th mechanized corps of the 3rd army, the 6th mechanized and 6th cavalry corps of the 10th army. The overall leadership of the group was entrusted to the deputy commander of the Western Front, Lieutenant General I.V. Boldin.

In his memoirs, he wrote: “Time is running out, but I still cannot fulfill Pavlov’s order to create a mechanized cavalry group. The most unpleasant thing is that I don’t know where the 11th mechanized corps of D.K. Mostovenki is located. We have no contact with him or with the 3rd Army, which he belongs to. During the night I sent several officers to search for the corps, but not one of them returned.”

Boldin received only the 6th Mechanized Corps of General M.G. Khatskelevich, who had 1021 tanks (of which 352 were new types of combat vehicles: KV-1 and T-34). Although he reported a month and a half before the start of the war to the Central Military Command that his mechanized corps was fully ready to carry out any combat missions, in the reality of the war it turned out that his tanks had only a quarter of their fuel supply, and the warehouses were blown up by retreating units or burned by enemy aircraft. Therefore, the very next day Khatskelevich reported to Boldin about the lack of fuel and ammunition. A difficult decision was made: to blow up tanks without fuel so that they would not fall to the enemy.

At this time, all the activities of General Pavlov came down to issuing orders, like this (to Commander-10 K.D. Golubev): “Why didn’t the mechanized corps advance? Who is guilty? Take action immediately and don’t panic. You need to beat the enemy in an organized manner, and not run away without control…”

Later, Boldin would bitterly note: “After the war, I learned that Pavlov gave my non-existent group one combat order after another, not at all interested in whether they reached me, without thinking about whether they were real in the situation that prevailed on Western Front. Why did Pavlov need to issue these orders? Who did he send them to? Perhaps they served only to create the appearance in front of Moscow that some measures were being taken on the Western Front to counter the advancing enemy. I did not receive any of these orders; they remained in the military archives, as a painful reminder of the tragedy of the first days of the war.”

At the trial, Pavlov will justify himself:

“In general, the communications commander does not lead. The organization of communications in the army is led by the chief of staff, not the commander. I wrote down this point, that I deliberately did not manage the organization of communications, in order to quickly appear before the proletarian court.”

In one day of fighting, tank units and formations of the Wehrmacht advanced into Soviet territory to a depth of 25 to 30 kilometers. Our 22nd Tank and 6th Rifle Divisions suffered significant losses in personnel and military equipment. There are only a few aircraft left in the 10th Mixed Air Division. Taking all this into account, Korobkov asked for instructions from the representative of the front headquarters, General I.N. Khabarov regarding further actions. The answer was: “You know better from the situation.” Accustomed to only obeying, the general was confused.

In his diary of June 22, General Franz Halder assessed the situation as follows:

“Tactical surprise led to the fact that enemy resistance directly on the border turned out to be weak and disorderly, and therefore we managed to capture bridges across border rivers everywhere and break through border guard positions (field fortifications) located near the border.”

Colonel General Heinz Guderian testifies to the same thing in his book “Memoirs of a Soldier”:

“The surprise attack on the enemy was achieved along the entire front of the tank group. West of Brest-Litovsk (Brest), the 24th Tank Corps captured all the bridges across the Bug, which turned out to be in full working order… However, the enemy soon recovered from the initial confusion and began to put up stubborn resistance.”

On June 24, the 4th Army ceased to exist. The battles with the enemy were now carried out in different directions by disparate units, mostly from different units.

On this day, the commander of the 3rd Army reported to Pavlov that “the communication lines to Volkovysk — Lida are completely destroyed and I cannot restore them with my own means. I have only one radio station for communication with front headquarters. I haven’t had the orientation of the front for two days.”

The report of the commander of the 4th Army shows an almost similar picture:

“Communication and control of troops… are extremely difficult due to the complete lack of wire communications and the lack (due to losses) of radio equipment and mobile equipment.”

In all this confusion, even the Nazis could not get their bearings. The command of Army Group Center in its assessment of the situation on June 24 noted:

“…It is still difficult to establish how and where the enemy will organize a resistance front…”

At the trial, the former communications chief of the front headquarters, General A.T. Grigoriev will show:

“I was never a criminal before the Soviet Union. I honestly tried to do my duty, but I could not fulfill it, because I did not have the parts at my disposal. The units were not mobilized in a timely manner, and the communications troops of the General Staff were not mobilized in a timely manner.”

From Pavlov’s entries in the combat log of the Western Front. For June 25, 1941: “During the day, no data on the situation at the front was received by the front headquarters.” For June 26: “3rd Army — there is no data on the position of troops at front headquarters. 10th Army — the position of the units is unknown. 4th Army continues to retreat to Bobruisk.”

The retreat began.

“The Volkovysk-Slonim highway was littered with abandoned tanks, burnt-out vehicles, and broken guns so that traffic was impossible. Columns of prisoners reached 10 km in length,” local residents recalled.

From military archive documents:

“The army troops resisted until June 26, after which a disorderly retreat began… The panic was facilitated by the fact that on the night of June 22-23, the entire party and Soviet leadership of the Bialystok region shamefully fled. All employees of the NKVD and NKGB, led by the heads of the agencies, also fled… Hostile elements raised their heads. They released 3 thousand arrested people from prison, who began robberies and pogroms, and opened fire from windows at passing units and rear areas.”

However, despite all these facts, Pavlov will declare during the judicial investigation:

“I believe that all the troops of the Western Front were fully prepared for war. And I would not say that the war took us by surprise and unprepared. During the period June 22–26, 1941, there was no panic either in the troops or in the leadership, with the exception of the 4th Army, in which the command was completely confused.

There was no disorganization when retreating to new defensive positions. Everyone knew where to go.”

And he will add:

“After I gave the order to the commanders to bring the troops into combat condition, Korobkov reported to me that his troops were ready for battle. In fact, it turned out that at the first shot his troops fled.”

In the statistical study, “The classification of secrecy has been removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts” notes: “in the Belarusian strategic defensive operation from June 22 to July 9, 1941, troops of the Western Front and the Pinsk military flotilla, a total of 627,300 people, took part. During the operation, they lost 417,790 soldiers and officers,” or 66.6% of the total number of troops.

It was a severe defeat. Of the 44 divisions, 24 were completely defeated, the remaining 20 lost from 30 to 90% of their forces and equipment.

By July 10, in the western direction, the Germans had advanced inland to 450-600 km and reached the Dnieper-Western Dvina line. Belarus was lost, and there was a threat of a breakthrough to Smolensk.

On July 3, 1941, Franz Halder wrote in his diary:

“When we cross the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, it will be not so much about defeating the enemy’s armed forces, but rather about taking away the enemy’s industrial areas and not giving him the opportunity, using the gigantic power of his industry and inexhaustible human reserves, to create new armed forces strength.”

According to Zhukov’s recollections, on June 30, his conversation with Pavlov took place. The latter confirmed the seriousness of the situation. Zhukov conveyed the request of the Headquarters to gather all the front troops as soon as possible and bring them into proper condition, to prevent enemy forces from breaking through to the Bobruisk area.

On the same day, Stalin, in a conversation with Zhukov, will give him the order to summon Pavlov to Moscow. At the very first meeting of the State Defense Committee, a decision was made to remove Pavlov from the post of commander of the Western Front.

In addition, according to various testimonies, on the eve of Stalin he ordered Mehlis to immediately leave for the Western Front as a member of the Military Council and figure out what was happening there and who was to blame for what had happened.

When Pavlov arrived in Moscow, Stalin did not receive him. Instead, on July 2, Pavlov had a meeting with Molotov.

The general outlined the reasons for the retreat of the troops after the battle on the Berezina, noting that there were no forces to deter the advancing German armies, and no reinforcements were expected. Staying there, he said, meant destroying all the people and the remains of equipment.

When saying goodbye, Molotov did not shake his hand.

From a letter from General Pavlov’s wife, Alexandra Fedorovna, to Khrushchev, dated April 20, 1956:

“…On July 2, Pavlov was summoned to Moscow. Was at a reception with V.M. Molotov. Returning from the appointment, my husband told me that he had given V.M. Molotov’s explanation of the reasons for the retreat after the battle on the Berezina: there was nothing to restrain, reinforcements were not expected, to remain meant to destroy all the people and the remains of the equipment. Then my husband told me that he was being sent to command tank troops to S.K. Timoshenko, and the issue of retreat would be discussed at the bureau.

On July 3, getting ready for the front, my husband said: “I’m going to go beat Guderian, I know him from Spain”… And in response to my question: “Should I put on your dress uniform?” — answered: “We’ll win, you’ll come to Berlin and bring it!”

Every time, until my death, I cannot remember these last words of my husband without emotion.

To the front Pavlov D.G. left on July 3 at 9 a.m., accompanied by a colonel for assignments from Yanovitsky A.V. and driver Naumenko N. along the Moscow-Minsk highway, towards Smolensk. I received nothing more from my husband, no news. The only rumors that reached me were that a car was supposedly sent after my husband to arrest him, and that it was one of Beria’s deputies who arrested him (it turns out he didn’t make it to Smolensk)….”

On July 4, special officers stopped the car of Pavlov, who was driving to the front headquarters in Gomel, near the city of Dovsk.

During the search, Pavlov’s identity card and party card, a wallet with money in the amount of 2,220 rubles and chrome boots, a drape overcoat and a French jacket, three Orders of Lenin, a Gold Star of Hero, two Orders of the Red Banner and a badge of a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, shirts and a Mauser were confiscated with 45 rounds.

Syromyatnikov, who was present at the arrest, recalled:

“Immediately after his arrest, Pavlov flatly refused to give any testimony and answer questions from investigators of the 3rd Directorate of the USSR NGO, stating that “interrogation is possible only in the presence of the People’s Commissar of Defense or the Chief of the General Staff.” And even when Mehlis became aware of this and he came to Pavlov’s first interrogation, the latter again stated: “I repeat again, I will answer questions only in the presence of the People’s Commissar of Defense or the Chief of the General Staff.”

Former state security captain I.G. Boyko described what happened after the arrest: “At about 16 o’clock we were in Smolensk, in the office of the head of the NKGB. After some time, Mehlis entered the office and immediately, with his characteristic harshness and lack of restraint, attacked Pavlov with anger and curses, using expressions such as “scoundrel, scoundrel, traitor, traitor, opened the front to Moscow for the Germans” and others. Pavlov, sitting in a chair, tried to object to Mehlis, but nothing worked for him under the hail of words from an extremely irritated Mehlis. After 10-15 minutes, Mekhlis and the others came out, and I was ordered to conduct a personal search of Pavlov, document it as required, which I did. After the departure of Mehlis and the others, Pavlov, remaining with me, began to express his indignation that Mehlis called him a traitor, however, admitting his guilt for the unpreparedness of the district troops to repel the attack of the Nazi troops, despite the warning of the People’s Commissar of Defense the day before, for the loss of almost all aviation at border airfields at the start of the war, for the failure to ensure and loss of communication between the district headquarters and the armies and formations in the first days of the war, which led to the loss of command and control of the troops and ignorance of the situation on the border.

In a conversation with me, he often repeated: “I am guilty and must bear responsibility for my guilt, but I am not a traitor.” Having calmed down after a while, Pavlov asked me for permission to eat and drink some cognac (he had chicken, bread and a bottle of cognac in his suitcase). I allowed him to eat, but with regard to cognac, I told him that this should not be done. To which Pavlov said: “Well, they arrested me and don’t give me a drink.” After persistent requests, I gave in to him and allowed him to drink a little. Distracted by recording and drawing up the search report, I did not notice how Pavlov drank almost the entire bottle of cognac in a matter of minutes. When I noticed this, I took the rest of the cognac from him, to which Pavlov said: “Well, I drank it for the last time in my life.” When I asked why the last time, he replied: “They will shoot me, I know Stalin well, he will not forgive me for what happened.”

On July 5, the investigator of the USSR NGO Directorate Pavlovsky prepared a decree for his arrest.

In the certificate of the arrested person, the deputy on duty assistant to the head of the Internal Prison of the NKGB of the USSR will record that “both things and valuables were accepted according to the protocol.” And further: “Received from Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov: 1 piece soap dish, leather gloves. 1 item, slippers 1 item, toothbrush case 1 item, shaving glass 1 item, shaving brush 1 item, suitcase cover 1 item.”

On July 6, Mehlis sent a telegram addressed to Stalin, also signed by Marshal Timoshenko and another member of the military council of the front, Ponomarenko:

“Moscow, the Kremlin, Stalin. The Military Council established the criminal activities of a number of officials, as a result of which the Western Front suffered a heavy defeat. The military council decided:

1) Arrest the former chief of staff of the Klimovsky Front, the former deputy commander of the Air Force of the Tayursky Front and the chief of artillery Klich.

2) Put on trial before a military tribunal the commander of the 4th Army Korobkov, the commander of the 9th Air Division Chernykh, the commander of the 42nd Infantry Division Lazarenko, the commander of the tank corps Oborin.

3) We arrested the chief of communications of the front Grigoriev, the head of the topographic department of the front Dorofeev, the head of the department of the front staffing department Kirsanov, the combat training inspector of the Air Force headquarters Yurov and the chief of military trade Sheinkin.

4) The commissary department of the ABTU Berkovich, the commander of the 8th disciplinary battalion Dykman and his deputy Krol, the head of the Minsk district sanitary warehouse Belyavki, the head of the district military veterinary laboratory Ovchinnikov, the commander of the artillery regiment division Sbirannik are being put on trial. Tymoshenko. Mehlis. Ponomarenko. 6.7. ’41.”

Permission was received on the same day:

“Tymoshenko, Mehlis, Ponomarenko. The State Defense Committee approves of your measures to arrest Klimovsky, Oborin, Tayursky and others and welcomes these measures as one of the surest ways to improve the health of the front. No. 7387. July 6, 41 I. Stalin.”

On July 8, 1941, the head of the 4th Department of the 3rd Directorate of the People’s Commissariat of Defense, Brigadier Commissar Bolotin, sent special message No. 37030 to two members of the State Defense Committee – Georgy Malenkov and Lavrenty Beria, as well as the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Georgy Zhukov. (See photo)

He informed that the commander of the 4th Army of the Western Front, Major General Alexander Korobkov, “showed cowardice and did not organize the defense of army units… On June 23, 1941, he, along with his headquarters, left for Pinsk, where he told the regional military commissar, Major Emelyanov, that “we are surrounded by enemy troops” and, without giving any orders to prepare units for battle, he left for Minsk.”

After which Major Emelyanov, being also the head of the Pinsk garrison, “gathered the unit commanders and gave the order to prepare the units for evacuation, and for the Pinsk military hospital to evacuate immediately. At the same time, he ordered the head of District Warehouse No. 847, military technician 1st rank Razumovsky, to blow up the warehouse.” Razumovsky “complied with the order of his superiors on June 24.”

The explosion of the warehouse destroyed about 300–400 wagons with artillery shells of various calibers, rifle cartridges and other ammunition, “while units of the 4th Army located 70 km from Pinsk were left without ammunition.” Also, “the explosion of the warehouse complicated the military operations of the Red Army units operating at the front”, “caused panic among the residents of Pinsk”, as a result of which “those called up for mobilization, who were in the military camp, fled after the explosion of the warehouse. Emelyanov and Razumovsky were arrested.

…After the flight of the command of the 4th Army in the Pinsk direction, a number of units were formed from the remnants of the 4th Army, which do not have a single leadership and fight independently,” and the units of the 47th Rifle Corps operating as part of the 4th Army “were armed insufficiently provided. There are a total of 4 45 mm guns and 12 122 mm guns. There is not enough ammunition even for these weapons.” Therefore, “on June 28–29, when the enemy crossed the Berezina River, parts of the corps were forced to fire at the enemy with single shots due to the remains of shells.” At the same time, “On June 29, during artillery shelling of our units from the enemy, about 500 people fled from the front line. All of them have been detained.”

The document is written in Beria’s hand: “t. Malenkov. My opinion: Korobkov should be arrested and tried as a coward and a traitor.”

Malenkov: “For. Arrest after replacing Korobkov with Rokossovsky. Malenkov.”

Vyacheslav Molotov: “I agree.”

Beria again: “t. Tutushkin /Deputy Head of the 3rd Directorate, Divisional Commissioner — Yu.Ch./. Execute as indicated by Comrade Malenkov and Comrade Molotov.”

Below is a report on the execution: “Korobkov has been arrested. Tutushkin”

On July 8, 1941, Korobkov was taken into custody.

From the interrogation protocol of General Pavlov dated July 7:

Question: Have you been told the reason for your arrest?

Answer: I was arrested on the afternoon of July 4th of this year. in Dovsk, where it was announced to me that I had been arrested by order of the Central Committee.

Later the deputy spoke to me prev Council of People’s Commissars Mehlis and announced that I was arrested as a traitor.

Question: In that case, proceed to testify about your treacherous activities.

Answer: I am not a traitor. The defeat of the troops I commanded occurred for reasons beyond my control.

Question: The investigation has evidence that your actions over a number of years were treasonous, which were especially evident during your command of the Western Front.

Answer: I am not a traitor; there was no malicious intent in my actions as a front commander.

It is also not my fault that the enemy managed to penetrate deep into our territory…

At 3:30 a.m. The People’s Commissar of Defense called me on the phone again and asked – what’s new? I answered him that there is nothing new now, I have established contact with the armies and the corresponding instructions have been given to the commanders…

Over the next 15 minutes I received the following information from the commanders:

From the commander of the 10th Army — “everything is calm”; from the 4th Army — “everywhere and everything is calm, the troops are fulfilling the task you set.” When I asked whether the 22nd Tank Division was leaving Brest, I received the answer: “Yes, it is leaving, like other units.” The commander of the 3rd Army answered me that nothing new had happened to him…

I went to report the new situation to the People’s Commissar of Defense and before I reached Moscow, Kuznetsov called me on the phone, reporting: “There is artillery and machine-gun fire on the entire front. Over Grodno, up to 50-60 planes are bombing the headquarters, I am forced to go to the basement.” I told him over the phone to enter “Grodno-41” into the case (the conventional password for the cover plan) and to act without hesitation, to take the right place with the headquarters. After that, I urgently called Bialystok, Bialystok replied: “Now it’s calm at the front.”

At approximately 4.10–4.15 I spoke with Korobkov, who also replied: “Everything is calm here.”

About 8 minutes later, Korobkov reported that “aircraft attacked Kobrin, there was terrible artillery fire at the front.” I suggested that Korobkov bring “Kobrin ’41” into action and ordered him to keep the troops in his hands and begin to act with full responsibility.

Everything that the commanders reported to me, I immediately and accurately reported to the People’s Commissar of Defense. The latter replied: “Act as the situation dictates.”

Question: How many minutes later did you report to the People’s Commissar of Defense Kuznetsov’s message that the enemy had opened artillery and machine-gun fire in the area where his army was located?

Answer: I reported Kuznetsov’s message to the People’s Commissar in 10–12 minutes.

Question: Continue to outline the further situation at the front.

Answer: After the report to the People’s Commissar of Defense, I ordered the headquarters to enter into communications in accordance with our plan, and especially into radio communications. The HF check showed that this connection with all armies was interrupted…

Question: How did events develop further?

Answer: Having received very fragmentary information from the headquarters of the 4th Army that this army in the Zhabenko area was going to launch a counterattack to the enemy, I was perplexed by this message, not understanding how in such a short time the 4th Army could retreat 30 km from Brest…

I gave the order to inform Korobkov by radio telegram so that he would not act without permission and would not abandon the lines so easily, but would fight at each line until the front headquarters allowed the withdrawal…

In the afternoon, Kuznetsov reported that of the three radio stations he had, two were broken, and the remaining one was damaged; he asked for a radio station to be dropped off. During the same time, information was received from him that Sapotskin had been abandoned by our units, and Kuznetsov, with a trembling voice, stated that, in his opinion, a number remained from the 56th Rifle Division. I answered him that there is no point in panicking early, people will gather…

Finally, Kuznetsov asked: “I feel that we will have to leave Grodno, in which case what about the warehouses and families of the command staff, many of them have already remained with the enemy.” I replied that if any points were left, warehouses and all goods that could not be taken out would be completely destroyed. Kuznetsov handed the phone to a member of the Military Council, Biryukov, who again asked — what to do with the families? I answered: “Since I found a battle, now the commanders’ job is not to take care of their families, but to care about how the battle is conducted”…

Assessing the entire situation, I saw that the headquarters of the 3rd Army had left Grodno and moved to Luno, but the enemy was not showing any particular pressure or persecution of the 3rd Army. On the left flank of the 10th Army, the enemy, at the cost of great effort, is developing success, pushing our units back. In the remaining sectors of the 10th Army, all enemy attempts to go on the offensive were repulsed. In the 4th Army, the command is completely confused, control of the troops is lost, and the enemy is quickly developing success, having the Bobruisk-Brest highway as the axis of movement…

Question: Have you taken all measures to provide the army with radio stations?

Answer: Yes, I took all measures in this regard. When, on the first day of the battle, Kuznetsov called me and asked me to send a radio station, since the three he had were broken, I requested them from Moscow by plane. Moscow did not respond at first, but after my repeated demands, it replied that it had sent 18 radio stations, but these radio stations were not received until the day of my arrest…

For telephone conversations with the Air Force commander, I compiled the following code: Northern group – this meant the Smelovichi area, Northern 2nd — this meant the Pleschanitsa area and Southern – this was Bobruisk.

This code was established so that all aviation, depending on the situation, could be concentrated in any of these directions by simple order.

From the 25th to the 28th there was no radio contact with either the 3rd or 10th armies. An attempt by delegates to fly on airplanes ended with the planes being shot down. A large number of delegates were sent by roundabout routes in cars.

I do not know whether these delegates made it to the headquarters of the 10th and 3rd armies or not. People arriving from the 3rd and 10th armies brought information about where the headquarters of these armies or units were located, usually two days late. The 10th Army broke away from the Zelvyanka River and the 1st Anti-Tank Brigade emerged. It came out without a single shell. It was stopped at the Berezina and immediately replenished with shells in order to defend the Berezino crossing.

In the future, the main task was to find, by any means and at any cost, where our units were located. Paratroopers dropped in the area where our units were supposed to be located with the task of delivering an encrypted telegram or verbally conveying the direction of departure…

On the day of departure, I cannot accurately report the state of the units of the 3rd and 10th armies, but I know that, based on the state of the troops, they will resist for a very long time and stubbornly and will take all measures to get out of the encirclement.

During the entire battle, the front headquarters worked with full tension; it was necessary to obtain information in every possible way, since the wire communication was completely inactive. It was torn apart in the western regions by local anti-Soviet elements and saboteurs – persons dropped from airplanes.

The degree of exhaustion of the chief of staff, General Klimovsky, was so great that I personally had to write down the orders given in my notebook or personally check their implementation, or send special people selected from political workers to check.

I consider the main reason for all the troubles to be the enormous superiority of enemy tanks and their new materiel and the enormous superiority of enemy aircraft.

Question: Can you name the losses of people and material that the Western Front suffered during your leadership?

Answer: Before the day of the arrest, I had no information about the losses of both people and material…

Question: Who is responsible for the breakthrough on the Western Front?

Answer: As I have already shown, the main reason for the rapid advance of German troops onto our territory was the clear superiority of enemy aircraft and tanks. In addition, Kuznetsov (Baltic Military District) placed Lithuanian units on the left flank, which did not want to fight. After the first pressure on the left wing of the Baltic states, the Lithuanian units shot their commanders and fled. This made it possible for German tank units to strike me from Vilnius. Along with this, the loss of control of the headquarters of the 4th Army by Korobkov and Sandalov with their units contributed to the rapid advance of the enemy in the Bobruisk direction, and the failure to comply with my order by the commander of the 10th Army, General Golubev, to carry out an attack on Bryansk with the 6th mechanized corps in order to defeat the enemy mechanized group, after which was at my disposal in the area of ​​Volkovysk, deprived me of the opportunity to have a proper strike group.

Question: Were there any treasonous actions on the part of your subordinates?

Answer: No, there were not. Some workers were somewhat confused by the rapidly changing environment.

Question: What is your personal fault in breaking through the front?

Answer: I took all measures to prevent a breakthrough by German troops. I don’t consider myself to blame for the situation created at the front.

Question: How long did you command the Western Special Military District?

Answer: One year.

Question: Were parts of the district prepared for military action?

Answer: Units of the district were prepared for military action, with the exception of the newly formed 17th, 20th, 13th, 11th mechanized corps. Moreover, in the 13th and 11th corps, one division each was trained, and the rest, having received recruits, had only training equipment, and even then not everywhere. The 14th Mechanized Corps had only one poorly trained motorized division and rifle regiments of tank divisions.

Question: If the main parts of the district were prepared for military action, you received the order to move on time, then the deep breakthrough of German troops into Soviet territory can only be attributed to your criminal actions as front commander.

Answer: I categorically deny this accusation. I did not commit treason or betrayal.

Question: Along the entire length of the state border, only in the sector that you commanded, German troops penetrated deep into Soviet territory. I repeat that this is the result of treasonous actions on your part.

Question: If the main parts of the district were prepared for military action, you received the order to move on time, then the deep breakthrough of German troops into Soviet territory can only be attributed to your criminal actions as front commander.

Answer: I categorically deny this accusation. I did not commit treason or betrayal.

Question: Along the entire length of the state border, only in the sector that you commanded, German troops penetrated deep into Soviet territory. I repeat that this is the result of treasonous actions on your part.

Answer: The breakthrough on my front occurred because I did not have a new material unit, as much as, for example, the Kiev Military District had…

From the interrogation protocol of General Pavlov dated July 9:

“I caused the main harm by my carelessness and slowness; I trusted my subordinates too much and did not check them. This carelessness rubbed off on them.

So, for example, I gave the order to withdraw units from Brest to the camp at the beginning of June of this year, and it was ordered that all troops be evacuated from Brest by June 15.

I did not check this order, and the commander of the 4th Army, Korobkov, did not carry it out, and as a result, the 22nd Tank Division, 6th and 42nd Rifle Divisions were caught by enemy fire when leaving the city, suffered heavy losses and more. in fact, the connections did not exist. I entrusted Oborin, the commander of the mechanized corps, with putting the mechanized corps in order, I did not personally check it, as a result, even the cartridges were not loaded into the vehicles in advance.

The 22nd Panzer Division, not following my instructions to leave Brest in advance, suffered huge losses from enemy artillery fire…

The loss of control of the headquarters of the 4th Army by Korobkov and Sandalov with their units contributed to the rapid advance of the enemy in the Bobruisk direction.”

And further: “The commander of the 4th Army, Korobkov, having lost control and, apparently, being confused, was unable to sufficiently cover the main direction with his own forces, at least by pulling the 49th division to this direction.”

But: “With regard to the construction of fortified defenses, I also committed criminal inaction on my part. In 1940, only individual units were built, and not a continuous line of fortifications, and I raised this question only in 1941… As a result, the URs were not ready for battle… Instead, given the situation abroad, already at the end of May to bring all my units to their original positions and thereby make it possible to take the correct battle formations, I was waiting for directives from the General Staff, lost time, and as a result delayed the concentration of troops, so that the war found more than half of my forces on the march to their original areas. I allowed a schematic approval of warehouses close to the border at 50–60 kilometers. As a result, the warehouses were set on fire by enemy aircraft in the first two days, or our troops were forced to tear them down themselves while retreating.

Regarding aviation. I completely entrusted the dispersal of aviation to field airfields, and at the airfields – to individual aircraft, and did not check the accuracy of the report of Air Force Commander Kopec and his deputy Tayursky. I made a criminal mistake that aviation was stationed at field airfields closer to the border, at airfields intended for training in the event of our attack, but not for defense. As a result, on the very first day of the war, aviation suffered huge losses, not having time to take off…

What happened on the Western Front makes me convinced of great betrayal in the Brest direction. I know this traitor… I did not intentionally open the front to the enemy. The German breakthrough was due to my inactivity and failure to comply with the instructions of the Central Committee on constant mobilization readiness.”

However, how the connection was organized then can be seen in the following tragic example.

Former deputy chief of the operations department of the front headquarters, Major General B.A. Fomin recalled:

“Communication was maintained by U-2 and SB aircraft, armored vehicles and passenger cars… Suffice it to give the following example: on June 26, it was necessary to transmit a combat order to the armies to withdraw to the river line. Shara and further through Nalibokskaya Pushcha.

To deliver the encrypted order, I sent one U-2 plane to each army with the order to land near the command post and hand over the order; one SB plane for each army with the order to drop a paratrooper with an encrypted order near the command post for delivery, and one armored vehicle with an officer for delivery of the same encrypted order.

Results: all the U-2s were shot down, all the armored vehicles were burned, and only at the CP of the 10th Army (the Zamkovy Lyas tract near Volkovysk) two paratroopers with orders were dropped from the SB.”

General Lyapin during a conversation with historian P.A. Palchikov said:

“The third type of provocation by the Nazis includes the incident that occurred on the night of June 27 at the command post in the Volkovysk area. At about 2.00 on 27.06, under the escort of tankers from the reserve tank regiment, two paratrooper pilots were brought to us, bringing the order of the commander of the front forces. The pilots stated that they were dropped from an SB plane at night and ended up on a detachment of a reserve tank regiment, which detained them and brought them to us.

Having received the envoys in person, I first checked their documents. The identity cards turned out to be made according to the form, but the covers were of different formats and colors. The envoys did not have any special travel allowances. When asked who sent them, they answered that Pavlov sent them personally, and he instructed them. Having found out who I was, they handed me a voluminous encrypted message and demanded, on behalf of General Pavlov, a copy of the order to the army troops that would be issued in execution of the specified encrypted telegram.

Having handed over the encryption to the encryption department, I ordered the pilots to wait. However, after a few minutes I was informed that the telegram could not be deciphered. Our encryption department had not been able to decipher a single encryption code from the front headquarters in the previous days, so the report about the impossibility of deciphering the delivered encryption code did not come as a surprise. It was decided to send a cipher department employee to the headquarters of the 3rd Army, located in Ros, and try to decipher the brought document using the cipher organ of this army. We believed that this document would finally give us the opportunity to navigate the situation and establish the goal of the army’s further actions, which was extremely necessary under the current conditions.

The arriving pilots expressed a desire to also go to the 3rd Army, where they were supposed to hand over a similar document to Lieutenant General Kuznetsov. I gave them permission and they left.

I did not have time then to follow the representatives of General Pavlov, and I did not see when they arrived from the headquarters of the 3rd Army. But, as it turned out later, one of them arrived in a car together with Marshal Kulik and an employee of our encryption department two hours earlier than the other. The cipher telegram could not be deciphered at the headquarters of the 3rd Army, and in the meantime, the previously arrived representative was seriously interrogated in the Special Department. Confused by the testimony, the interrogated man rushed to run into the forest, but was killed by an employee of the Special Department.

After some time, another representative arrived on the armored car that had previously brought Marshal Kulik, who was immediately captured by the head of the operational department, Lieutenant Colonel Markushevich, and handed over to the employees of the Special Department. The last representative refused to give any testimony at all, he only cursed everyone with obscene words, and a few minutes later he was shot right there, at the checkpoint.

At first, I didn’t think that the representatives who arrived were spies or provocateurs. There were doubts even when one of them was killed, but observing the behavior of the second, my doubts in this regard were dispelled.

Analyzing now the event with the pilots that took place at the checkpoint in the Volkovysk area, unfortunately, we have to admit that our vigilance was not at the proper level. In fact, the front headquarters could not possibly know where the headquarters of our army was located, while the Germans knew our every step.”

Only in 1991, Pavel Aleksandrovich Palchikov managed to find out that they were indeed officers of the operational management and communications department of the front, establish their names and send belated funerals to their relatives. The described episode of the initial period of the war clearly reflected the atmosphere of confusion, confusion, confusion that reigned among the troops and the mood of the people…

So, in vain, due to a misunderstanding, due to poor communication and ill-conceived actions of the command, people died.

Now the time has come for the leaders themselves to die.

At 0 o’clock. 20 minutes. On July 22, 1941, the court hearing began.

Between the presiding judge at the trial V.V. The following dialogue took place between Ulrich and Pavlov:

– Do you plead guilty?

“The accusation brought against me is understandable. I do not admit myself guilty of participating in an anti-Soviet military conspiracy. I was never a member of an anti-Soviet conspiratorial organization.

I plead guilty to the fact that I did not have time to check that the commander of the 4th Army, Korobkov, fulfilled my order to evacuate troops from Brest. Back in early July, I gave the order to withdraw units from Brest to the camps. Korobkov did not carry out my order, as a result of which three divisions were defeated by the enemy upon leaving the city…

I plead guilty to the fact that I understood the directive of the General Staff of the Red Army in my own way and did not put it into effect in advance, that is, before the enemy attacked. I knew that the enemy was about to move out, but from Moscow they assured me that everything was in order, I was ordered to be calm and not to panic. I can’t name the person who told me this.

– Do you confirm your testimony given at the preliminary investigation several hours ago, that is, on July 21, 1941?

– I ask you not to believe these testimonies. I gave them when I was in bad condition. I ask you to believe my testimony dated July 7, 1941.

– In your testimony dated July 21, 1941 (case file 82, volume 1) you say that “I first learned about the goals and objectives of the conspiracy while still in Spain, in 1937, from Meretskov.”

“While in Spain, I had one conversation with Meretskov, during which Meretskov told me: “Let’s gain experience in this war and transfer this experience to our troops.” At the same time, from Parisian newspapers, I learned about the anti-Soviet military conspiracy that existed in the Red Army.

– A few hours ago you said something completely different, and in particular, about your enemy activities.

– I have never been involved in anti-Soviet activities. I gave evidence about my participation in the anti-Soviet conspiracy while in a state of insanity.

– On the same page 82 of the 1st volume you say: “The goals and objectives of the conspiracy, which Meretskov outlined to me, boiled down to making a change of leadership in the army, putting at the head of the army people pleasing to the conspirators – Uborevich and Tukhachevsky.” Did you have such a conversation with him?

“I didn’t have such a conversation with him.”

– What conversations did you have with Meretskov about the anti-Soviet military conspiracy upon your return from Spain?

– Upon returning from Spain, in a conversation with Meretskov about the uncovered conspiracy in the army, I asked him: “Where are we going to take this bastard?” Meretskov answered me: “We have no time for conspiratorial matters now. Our work has started, and we have to roll up our sleeves and get to work.”

– At the preliminary investigation, June 21, 1941, you said something completely different about this. And in particular, on page 83 of the 1st volume, you gave the following testimony: “Upon returning from Spain, in a conversation with Meretskov on issues of conspiracy, we decided, in order to save ourselves from failure, to temporarily not carry out anti-Soviet activities, to go deep underground, showing ourselves in the service line only on the positive side ”

— During the preliminary investigation, I said what I said to the court. Based on this, the investigator wrote down differently. I signed.

– On page 86 of the same testimony dated June 21, 1941, you say: “We maintained constant contact with Meretskov all the time. The latter, in repeated conversations with me, systematically expressed his defeatist sentiments and proved the inevitability of defeat of the Red Army in the upcoming war with the Germans. From the moment Germany began military operations in the West, Meretskov said that now the Germans have no time for us, but if they attack the Soviet Union and the German army wins, it will not make us any worse.” Did you have such a conversation with Meretskov?

– Yes, I had such a conversation with him. This conversation took place between me and him in January 1940 in Raivola.

– Who is this “it won’t be worse for us”?

– I understood him, as for me and for him.

– Did you agree with him?

– I didn’t object to him, since the conversation took place while drinking. This is my fault.

-Have you reported this to anyone?

– No, and I am also to blame for this.

– Did Meretskov tell you that Stern is a participant in the conspiracy?

– No, I didn’t. During the preliminary investigation, I called Stern a participant in the conspiracy only because during the Battle of Guadalajara he gave a criminal order for the withdrawal of units from Guadalajara. Based on this, I concluded that he was a participant in the conspiracy.

– During the preliminary investigation (case file 88, volume 1) you gave the following testimony: “In order to deceive the party and the government, I know for sure that the General Staff’s wartime order plan for tanks, cars and tractors has been overestimated by times.” in 10. The General Staff justified this overestimation by the availability of capacities that industry could provide… With this plan, Meretskov intended for wartime to confuse all calculations for the supply of tanks, tractors and cars to the army.” Do you confirm these statements?

– Basically yes. That was the plan. It contained such nonsense. Based on this, I came to the conclusion that the plan for wartime orders was given with the aim of deceiving the party and the Soviet government.

– You end your testimony of July 21 with this: “Being embittered by the fact that many previously close Red Army commanders to me were arrested and convicted, I chose the surest way of revenge – organizing the defeat of the Red Army in the war with Germany. I partially managed to do what Tukhachevsky and Uborevich failed to do in their time, that is, open the front to the Germans.”

– I never had any anger. And there was no reason for that. I was a Hero of the Soviet Union. I was not connected with the previous top brass in the army. During the preliminary investigation, I was interrogated for 15 days about the conspiracy. I wanted to appear before the court as soon as possible and report to him about the real reasons for the defeat of the army. So I wrote about anger and called myself something I never was.

General Korobkov also categorically denied his guilt: “I don’t admit myself guilty. I can only plead guilty to the fact that I could not determine the exact beginning of hostilities. We received the order from the People’s Commissar of Defense at 04.00, when the enemy began to bomb us… Events unfolded at lightning speed. Our units were subjected to continuous attacks by large enemy aircraft and tank formations. With the forces that I had, I could not repel the enemy. I consider the reasons for the defeat of my units to be the enemy’s enormous superiority in aviation and tanks.”

When the presiding judge read out excerpts from Pavlov’s testimony, Korobkov became indignant: “I categorically deny Pavlov’s testimony. How can he say this if he has not been to my command post for 10 days? I had contact with all units, with the exception of the 46th Infantry Division, which was subordinate to the mechanized corps. During the preliminary investigation I was accused of cowardice. This is not true. I was at my post day and night. He was at the front all the time and personally led the units. On the contrary, the 3rd Directorate constantly accused me of the fact that the army headquarters was very close to the front.

When Pavlov’s testimony was read that the command of the 4th Army did not comply with his “orders for the early withdrawal of units from Brest,” Korobkov sarcastically replied that “the order for the withdrawal of units from Brest was not given by anyone. I personally have not seen such an order.”

Pavlov: “In June, on my order, the commander of the 28th Rifle Corps, Popov, was sent with the task of evacuating all troops from Brest to camps by June 15.”

Korobkov: “I didn’t know about that.”

Another defendant in the same case is the former chief of communications of the Western Front, Major General A.T. Grigoriev testified in his testimony: “The war took the Western Special Military District by surprise. The peaceful mood that reigned throughout the headquarters was certainly transmitted to the troops. Only this complacency can explain the fact that the aircraft were caught on the ground by a German raid. The army headquarters were in winter quarters and were destroyed, and finally, part of the troops (Brest garrison) were bombed in their winter quarters.”

Moreover, the district headquarters openly sabotaged the orders of the General Staff.

“Leaving Minsk, the commander of the communications regiment reported to me that the chemical warfare department did not allow him to take combat gas masks from the NZ. The artillery department of the district did not allow him to take cartridges from the NZ, and the regiment only has a guard norm of 15 cartridges per soldier, and the supply department did not allow him to take field kitchens from the NZ. Thus, even on the day of June 18, the contented departments of the headquarters were not oriented that war was close… And after the telegram from the Chief of the General Staff of June 18, the troops were not put on combat readiness.”

At the trial on July 22, he confirmed his testimony.

In his last word, Pavlov stated: “I ask that hostile activities be excluded from my testimony, since I was not involved in such. The reason for the defeat of the Western Front units was what was recorded in my testimony dated July 7, 1941, and the fact that rifle divisions are currently insufficient in the fight against large enemy tank units. The number of infantry divisions will not ensure our victory over the enemy. It is necessary to immediately organize new anti-tank divisions with new material, which will ensure victory.

Boxes could not withstand the blow of three enemy mechanized divisions, since he had nothing with which to fight them.

I was unable to properly organize the command and control of troops due to the lack of sufficient communications. I should have demanded radio operators from Moscow, but I didn’t.

Regarding fortified areas. I organized everything in my power. But I must say that the implementation of government measures has been slowed down.

I ask you to report to our government that there was no treason or betrayal in the Western Special District. Everyone worked with great tension. We are currently sitting in the dock not because we committed crimes during the period of hostilities, but because we did not prepare enough for this war in peacetime.”

General Korobkov also did not admit his guilt, saying in his last word that his 4th Army, “essentially, was not an army, since it consisted of four divisions and a newly formed corps. My divisions were stretched over a distance of 50 km. I could not hold back the advance of the enemy’s 3 mechanized divisions, since my forces were insignificant and no reinforcements came to me. For the first two days of the start of hostilities, my units were unable to move due to the huge number of enemy aircraft. Literally every vehicle we had was shot at by the enemy. The forces were unequal. The enemy was superior to us in every way.”

At 3:20 am, Ulrich read out the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. In accordance with it, on July 22, 1941, General Pavlov, together with other accused — generals Klimovskikh, Grigoriev, Korobkov — was found guilty under Articles 93-17b and 193-20b of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR — “negligence” and “failure to fulfill official duties” and was sentenced to deprivation of rank, awards and execution. On the same day, the sentence was carried out at the Butovo execution range of the NKVD.

“ORDER OF THE PEOPLE’S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR

WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE VERDICT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE USSR

ON THE CASE OF ARMY GENERAL D.G.PAVLOV, MAJOR GENERAL V.E.KLIMOVSKYKH,

A.T.GRIGORIEV AND A.A.KOROBKOV

No.0250

July 28, 1941

By order of the State Defense Committee, the former commander of the Western Front, General of the Army D.G. Pavlov, the former chief of staff of the same front, General Major V.E. Klimovskikh, former communications chief of the same front, Major General A.T. Grigoriev, former commander of the 4th Army, Major General A. A. Korobkov.

On July 22, 1941, the Supreme Court of the USSR considered the case against D.G. Pavlov, V.E. Klimovskikh, A.T. Grigoriev and Aleksanr Korobkov.

The judicial investigation established that:

1. a) the former commander of the Western Front D.G. Pavlov and the former chief of staff of the same front V.E. Klimovskikh, from the beginning of the military operations of the Nazi troops against the USSR, showed cowardice, inaction of the authorities, lack of management, allowed the collapse of military command, surrender of weapons and warehouses to the enemy, unauthorized abandonment of combat positions by units of the Western Front and this gave the enemy the opportunity to break through the front;
2. b) the former communications chief of the Western Front, Grigoriev A.T., having the opportunity to establish uninterrupted communications between the front headquarters and the active units and formations, showed alarmism and criminal inaction, did not use radio communications, as a result of which troop control was disrupted from the first days of hostilities;
3. c) the former commander of the 4th Army of the Western Front Aleksanr Korobkov showed cowardice and criminal inaction, shamefully abandoned the units entrusted to him, as a result of which the army was disorganized and suffered heavy losses.

Thus, Pavlov D.G., Klimovskikh V.E., Grigoriev A.T. and Aleksanr Korobkov violated the military oath, dishonored the high rank of a soldier of the Red Army, forgot their duty to the Motherland, their cowardice and alarmism, criminal inaction , the collapse of command and control, the surrender of weapons and warehouses to the enemy, and the unauthorized abandonment of combat positions by units caused serious damage to the troops of the Western Front.

By the Supreme Court of the USSR D.G. Pavlov, V.E. Klimovskikh, A.T. Grigoriev and Aleksanr Korobkov were stripped of their military ranks and sentenced to death.

The sentence has been carried out.

I warn that in the future, all those who violate the military oath, forget their duty to the Motherland, discredit the high rank of a soldier of the Red Army, all cowards and alarmists who willfully leave combat positions and hand over their weapons to the enemy without a fight will be mercilessly punished according to all the severity of the laws of war, regardless on faces.

The order is announced to all command personnel from the regiment commander and above.

People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR I. STALIN.”

In the summer of 1956, Colonel General Leonid Sandalov sent to Army General V.V. Kurasov’s letter in which he wrote:

“Why was it the commander of 4A Korobkov who was arrested and put on trial, whose army, although it suffered enormous losses, still continued to exist and did not lose contact with the headquarters of the Western Front? By the end of June 1941, one army commander was designated for trial from the Western Front, but only Army Commander 4 was available. The commanders of the 3rd and 10th armies were in an unknown place these days and there was no contact with them. This determined Korobkov’s fate. In the person of General Korobkov, we then lost a good commander, who, I believe, would later become one of the best commanders of the Red Army. General Korobkov should be rehabilitated first of all.”

I’m not going to argue with Sandalov — most likely the 4th Army would have had to retreat in any case. Moreover, then everyone retreated. But some fought in an organized manner, delaying the enemy, others, having lost contact with the troops, fled, opening the front.

In this case, something tells me that the general is simply trying to shield his old comrade.

Without initiative, without his own opinion (according to Sandalov himself), Korobkov, instead of preparing for the inevitable war, was decisive in only one thing — arresting those who reported to him about its imminent start and accusing them of alarmism. Yes, he was not the only one, there were others. Yes, perhaps he was used as an example to others. But this does not relieve, from my point of view, responsibility from him personally.

However, like Sandalov himself, later, in his military-historical essay “The First Days of the War”, published in 1961 under the heading “Secret”, removed only 28 years later, which few people like to quote when analyzing the front-line situation in June 1941 year, comes to the following conclusion:

“There is no doubt that the command of the troops and the headquarters of the Western Front, the command and headquarters of the armies, including the 4th Army, bear great responsibility for the defeat of the troops and the loss of Belarus in the initial period of the war.”

Where is the truth? Everyone is free to draw their own conclusions. I just presented the facts.

The situation is approximately the same with General Pavlov.

No doubt he made some movements.

For example, on issues of defensive construction he addressed the central government and party bodies of the USSR. On February 18, 1941, he sent report No.867 to Stalin, Molotov and Timoshenko, in which he asked to allocate significant funds for highway construction in Belarus. “I believe that the Western theater of military operations must necessarily be prepared during 1941, and therefore I consider it completely impossible to stretch out construction over several years,” it says. On April 29, 1941, he turned to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus and the Council of People’s Commissars of the BSSR with a proposal to provide assistance in completing the construction of 7 airfields by June 15, 1941, to urgently organize the production of fuel storage tanks in Belarus, to include in the plan the construction of unpaved roads parallel to the highway roads for tracked vehicles. The Military Council of the District asked the government of the Byelorussian SSR to complete the equipment of buildings for hospitals in the cities by July 15, 1941, and to bring the reserves of flour, cereals, canned food, as well as fuel in Belostotskaya, Brest, Belorussian and Western to the planned levels by July 15, 1941 railways.

But things did not go further than appeals or went extremely slowly.

General Pavlov also paid a lot of attention to the operational and tactical training of subordinate headquarters, generals and officers. Only from August 1940 until the start of the war, he personally conducted a front-line war game, 5 army field trips, an army command and staff game on the ground, 5 corps war games, a radio exercise with two mechanized corps, a corps and two division exercises with troops in winter conditions.

However, the shortcomings discovered during exercises and war games were not eliminated.

The exercise ended, and its results were forgotten, because the efforts of the headquarters were switched to preparing new elements of operational training for the district troops.

There was a semblance of vigorous activity, but the result was zero.

From Khrushchev’s memoirs: “When Stalin’s abuses of power were revealed and the rehabilitation of those innocently executed and imprisoned began, the military raised the issue of the rehabilitation of Pavlov and other generals who were convicted and executed for the collapse of the front in the first days of the war. This proposal was accepted and they were rehabilitated.”

The conclusion issued by the General Staff on November 5, 1956 in the Pavlov case reads:

“Army General Pavlov, due to the lack of the necessary experience in leading large operational formations (in office since June 1940) and insufficiently broad operational horizons, was unable to cope with the important tasks that confronted him in a very difficult situation, and especially in the first days of the war… However, serious omissions and shortcomings made by General Pavlov D.G. in the leadership of the district’s troops cannot be considered as his inaction, lack of management, or manifestation of cowardice. Moreover, Army General Pavlov cannot be accused of deliberately collapsing command and control of the front forces and surrendering to the enemy without a fight…

The accusation of generals Pavlov, Klimovsky, Grigoriev, Korobkov and Klich is based only on their testimony, in which they admitted some of their omissions in the service.

These testimonies are not confirmed by any objective evidence.”

Whether this is true or not is for you to judge.

In my opinion, a general’s heroism, as someone correctly noted, does not consist in personally going to the bayonet line, but, first of all, in clearly assessing the situation, making a decision and not being afraid to answer for it. On the contrary, defend it the way the border guards defended their land, the way they defended their families. They fought against superior forces, but did not surrender to the enemy. They fought for every piece of land as long as they had enough strength. And when they died, they left with faith: Victory Day will come! “You can’t outweigh everyone!”

In 1957, generals Pavlov, Korobkov, Klimovskikh and Grigoriev were posthumously rehabilitated “for lack of evidence of a crime.”

Let us remember today those who forged this Victory, thanks to whom we are alive and living today — the “Young Guard”, pioneer heroes, soldiers and officers of all branches of the military, those who lived, and those who gave the most precious thing — their lives — for us, ungrateful descendants, for us… who, having given up many other conquests, did not give up the Victory, kept it in their hearts and are trying to be worthy of those sacrifices that neither hacks working to order nor time will diminish…

Brandenburg 800 is also still alive. And for barbecuing on the Eternal Flame you have to punch someone in the face. It’s my opinion.