
“Web” — this is what Kyiv calls the attack by FPV drones on June 1, 2025 on military airfields of the Russian strategic aviation.
BIG DISASSEMBLY— 1
They say that the preparation lasted 1.5 years, was personally supervised by Vladimir Zelensky, and was led by the head of the SBU Vasyl Malyukh. The Cossacks are dancing and singing, which means that the basic immutability remains.
The operation was planned and carried out with maximum emphasis on the theatrical effect and with reference to the second agreement in Istanbul on June 2.
In the Russian Federation before the raid of Ukrainian drones there were at least 66 Tu-95 and Tu-160 aircraft, plus almost the same number of Tu-22M3.
We are clarifying the direct material damage from the correction on 06/01/25, but it seemed to be surprised by the small amount.
According to the first reports, something much more reasonable was expected. Especially considering that shortly before the “Web”, according to the “Military Review”, about 40 long-range Tu-22M3 bombers could be deployed to the Olenya airfield in the Murmansk region, as well as about 20 percent of the country’s energy Tu-95MS. The Olenya base had previously been attacked at least 10 times, measures were taken to protect it, and the current damage was limited.
In total, during the raid on 01.06.25 (“Web”), no more than 7 strategic targets were destroyed, including up to four Tu-95s. It should be clarified that all damaged strategies will not be restored soon.
It’s good that they did not reach the Ukrainka base in the Amur region (Tu-95MS) and did not even try to reach the Engels bases (TU-160 and Tu-95MS). First conclusion: the long-range strategic aviation of the Russian Federation did not suffer any material “catastrophe”.
But with all the coronavirus diseases that hung on the “Web”, this time we need to deal with it thoroughly and consistently.
Thanks to the opponent, the reason given is truly monumental.
BIG SHOWDOWN — 2
The most urgent problem after the “Web” is to sort things out with America.
Only two countries in the world — Russia and the USA — have a full-fledged nuclear triad:
— strategic aviation;
— intercontinental ballistic missiles;
— nuclear submarine missile carriers.
All three components are important here.
The presence of a triad ensures strategic stability: in the event of a deadly conflict, the loss of one or even two components of the triad preserves the potential for a retaliatory strike for the Russian Federation and the USA and thus guarantees mutual nuclear deterrence.
The triad cannot be touched, it is taboo.
During Operation “Web”, Ukraine for the first time in history carried out an overt, deliberate and targeted attack on the strategic aviation of the Russian Federation as a component of a vital triad.
According to the Russian nuclear doctrine, approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of November 19, 2024,
this is a “casus belli”.
The doctrine currently provides for a nuclear response to a critically dangerous attack using conventional weapons. And the “Web” is quite critically dangerous.
In addition, aggression by a non-nuclear state with the support of a nuclear power is considered a joint attack. There are few things whiter than this casus belli.
It is no secret that Ukraine under Volodymyr Zelensky acts as a client state for the United States.
US Presidential Special Representative Keith Kellogg has just officially confirmed that the United States is waging a “proxy war” with Russia through Ukraine. So maybe it was the United States — through its client — that attacked the Russian triad?
In this regard, in order to choose an adequate response to the “Web”, Russia should immediately receive official clarifications from the United States. Did Washington know about the “Web”? If it did, did it keep quiet? or gave Kyiv permission to attack the strategic aviation (and thus the nuclear triad) of the Russian Federation?
If Kyiv attacked the nuclear triad of the Russian Federation completely independently, without permission from Washington, then…
is Moscow free to choose its response?
And who the hell was guiding Ukrainian FPV drones via satellites using a GPS signal to strategic airfields of Russia? and then taking spectacular pictures of hits and sharing them with Kiev?
Who did that, huh?
BIG DISASSEMBLY — 3
While Istanbul is reading memoranda to each other, let’s return to the big disassembly.
This document explains a lot about the story of the allegedly “incredibly successful” attack of Ukrainian drones on strategic aviation airfields in the Russian Federation.
If there had been no theft bordering on treason, there would have been no pathological blindness (deliberate?) of the control bodies, and the incredible airfield raid of FPV drones would not have happened.
Conclusions?
Conduct an audit, punish the guilty, build caponiers for strategic aircraft.
By the way, reinforced concrete shelters are not needed to protect against FPV drones, light (but durable) metal canopies are enough.
ATTENTION. This publication is from 2021.
Four years have passed since then, three of which have been in a state of war.
BIG DISASSEMBLY — 4
We are resuming the BR after a break for the “second match” of the diplomatic teams of Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul.
The question of the reasons for the absence of shelters for strategic aviation aircraft at air bases has already been raised.
Moving on.
Question: how did trucks with special containers filled with drones and explosives, having traveled more than a thousand kilometers along federal and regional highways, manage to approach strategic air bases without inspection by 100 km, 50 km and almost right next to them (in the Murmansk and Irkutsk regions)?
Why is the “counter-access/area denial” (or A2/AD) mode, which is absolutely necessary in such cases, not installed or does not work? Where are the control and inspection posts?
Question:
Why does the automatic transfer of the object to the alarm mode of immediate and complete blocking of cellular telephony, communication channels and control not work at strategic air bases?
These are questions for the political space, they do not imply a rally discussion.Ucraine