The Reasons the Ottoman Empire Entered the WW1

The Armenian Genocide of 1915 was not a consequence of the First World War—it was one of the reasons the Ottoman Empire entered into the war.

I didn’t arrive at this conclusion quickly. For at least twenty years I tried to understand why the Turks embarked on the gamble of joining Germany.

One common explanation is that the Ottoman Empire hoped to recover the Caucasus, Egypt, Libya, Crimea, and other lost territories. But this was a country that had already lost two consecutive wars at the beginning of the twentieth century—the first against Italy, the second against Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece.

Even under the most favorable circumstances, it is unlikely the Ottomans would have gained any of those territories. Moreover, from the very beginning there was a real possibility that Germany might lose the war.

Another theory, which rivals the first in its implausibility, is that Russia somehow lured Turkey into the war in order to seize Constantinople. It is worth recalling what actually happened in 1914: the Ottomans first closed the Straits, and then the Ottoman fleet attacked Russian ports on the Black Sea, sinking the Russian minelayer Prut.

How did Russia respond? For about a week it tried to persuade the Ottomans to reconsider, suggesting that the incident could be blamed on German provocation.

There are other explanations as well, but none provides a convincing or decisive answer. By entering the First World War, the Ottoman Empire took an enormous risk. Why? It remains a historical mystery. As for me, I believe I have found the answer, even though it was hiding in plain sight all along.

The resolutions adopted at the October 1911 congress of the Committee of Union and Progress in Salonika called for the complete assimilation of the empire’s non-Turkish peoples. Behind that phrase one can clearly discern discussions about, and preparations for, a final solution to the problem of the empire’s national minorities. At that time, however, implementing such a program was impossible. It would have required, at the very least, a war with the Russian Empire, and perhaps with the entire Entente.

The Polish publicist and writer Bogdan Gembarski (1905–1978), who studied the Armenian Genocide, quotes the following passage from the transcript of a meeting of the Young Turk leadership held on October 15, 1914—just two weeks before the Ottoman Empire entered the war:

Dr. Nazım:

“The Armenian question must be resolved radically—by exterminating all Armenians. I believe I express the unanimous conviction of everyone present when I say that the problem will be solved as soon as the decision is made.”

Talaat Bey, Minister of the Interior:

“Under my responsibility, I shall undertake against the Armenians whatever I consider necessary…”

The French researcher Étienne Radap, writing in the Catholic intellectual journal Études in 1970, published an article entitled “The Armenian Question Remains Open.” I managed to locate it, though it was not an easy task. It quotes part of the document adopted following that October 15, 1914 meeting:

“We must act quickly and decisively… If we limit ourselves to local massacres such as those organized in Adana and the surrounding districts, we will only harm our cause by arousing the suspicions of those whom we intend to destroy later. We mean the Arabs and the Kurds. We must eradicate the Armenian nation completely at once, leaving not a single Armenian on our soil and consigning even the word ‘Armenian’ to oblivion. War provides the perfect opportunity: we need fear neither the Great Powers nor the protests of the world press. By the time they awaken, everything will already be finished. This time the massacres must become extermination. Not a single Armenian must remain alive.”

Somewhat later, the decision was made not to stop with the Armenians but also to eliminate Greeks, Assyrians, and Yazidis. However, the general course had already been established in 1911 and, presumably, had originated even earlier.

In my view, the only convincing explanation for why the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War was its determination to resolve what it regarded as the “national question.”

The war presented a unique opportunity to massacre largely defenseless Christian communities and Yazidis without regard for international opinion.

Of course, the Ottoman leaders did not expect that the war would end with the collapse of their empire. For centuries, they had acted with relative impunity and assumed they would do so again.