Ilya Ratkovsky
Yuri Chekalin: What attracts you to work as a historian?
Ilya Ratkovsky: In the profession of a historian, there are several incentives that help me work and develop. First of all, it is an opportunity to understand the history of your country in the most key moments. The history of the revolution, the Civil War are turning points, where there are phenomena that allow people to understand the origins, etc. Here I am also interested in identifying new sources, including memoirs on the Civil War, various new documents. It’s an extraordinary feeling when you find something new. So, recently I discovered one memory in which Ivan Sergeev was finally recorded – this is a terrorist worker who, according to the official Soviet version, killed Volodarsky in 1918. Very little was known about him, many even questioned his existence. But while analyzing the memoirs of one of the workers of Petrograd, I found a little material on his biography. Those. it turned out that the person is real.
It is important for a historian to find something new. This helps to make hypotheses, versions more scientific, correct. Restoration and reconstruction going on. This is the first.
And the second thing I like about the profession of a historian is working with students. This is an important aspect, because we are not even talking about the fact that as a result of lectures, seminars, I consolidate my ideas. For example, you read a course on the history of terror and terrorism, or on the history of white and red terror, and then a book is born. And here is precisely the opportunity through the students and together with them to raise new topics. Because when a student chooses a topic, naturally you must also be in the topic and go through a certain course with them before graduation. This year I have five bachelors graduated. Some of them have done very interesting work. For example, there is work on the city of Perm, Perm province during the Civil War. The person used 6 archives, 22 funds and revealed many documents for the first time. Those. these studies also stimulate them and help me to see the continuation of my activity, which in turn stimulates me to be more professional. It is also important to communicate with other historians during conferences, just personal communication, when you can argue and discuss various problems. All this, this is what interests me as a historian.
Yuri Chekalin: What films about the Civil War would you recommend?
Ilya Ratkovsky: There are probably several, but if you choose, I like “Two Comrades Were Serving”. This film is very interesting as a staging of specific destinies: there is a Bolshevik, there is an intellectual who accepted Soviet power, there is also a White Guard in the role of Vysotsky, there are other images. Those. this film is very talented both in terms of actors and in staging a personality in the Civil War.
A civil war is not only a conflict of some social groups, but also people who sacrifice themselves, their environment. That is well shown in this movie. Therefore, “Two Comrades Were Serving” is one of the best films.
If we talk about serials, then here, of course, the old version of “Walk through the torments.” Again, the fate of the family, sisters, officers, life, brief sketches of military operations, periods of the Civil War … That is, in my opinion, this is another of the best examples. But Tolstoy’s book is also remarkable. I like her even more than The Quiet Don. In “Quiet Don”, for all its genius, there are narrower problems, Cossacks, and “Walking through the torments” is a more Russian publication, in terms of a large format.
Yuri Chekalin: How do you feel about the “White Guard”?
Ilya Ratkovsky: I’ll tell you the truth, I certainly like it, both the book and the Soviet film adaptation. The latest film adaptation isn’t too bad either, especially since I was involved as a science advisor on several episodes. This is, firstly, the reception scene at the embassy, as well as a number of others. So this is one of the good reshoots of the series. Other options were not always successful, but this can be considered a solid four with a plus, or a four with a minus. Like the Soviet one, it can be recommended for viewing. Really well filmed. Although in the latter version it would be necessary to select the surroundings more carefully.
Yuri Chekalin: And “Running”?
Ilya Ratkovsky: Also, of course, the recommended Soviet option. I recommend many films about the Civil War, not the early eighties, but the seventies. Moreover, they very often had successful hits in the choice of actors for the main role. Of the unnamed – “Forty-first”. A film about the personal in the civil war.
This is a classic and must be watched.
About four or five years ago I gave a special course on the Civil War and it was about 1920. I asked the audience how many people watched the film “Two Comrades Were Serving” and it turned out that only two out of fifteen. And this is a specialized group. I then set the task to watch this film and said that if someone has a controversial mark when passing the test, we can talk about this film and it will be corrected in a positive way.
The film is publicly available but rarely seen. This is due to the form of submission, color. Either the classics are visible, the same “Chapaev” is wonderful, but black and white, so it is perceived a little more difficult. But taking into account the phenomenon of culture, and not just anecdotes, this is visible. But again, somehow, the majority only heard, while others read, but not Furmanov, but modern works about Chapaev.
Yuri Chekalin: Do you agree that the Stolypin reforms became one of the factors in unleashing the Civil War in Russia?
Ilya Ratkovsky: Yes, I think so. Because today they are often regarded in a positive way, with the addition that they were not allowed to be realized. What does enough time mean? After all, one must also take into account that the First World War could have begun even before the fourteenth year.
I am closer to the position of the British historian Edward Carr on the Stolypin reforms, who says that it is necessary to consider the success of the reform taking into account the demographic factor. Those. the growth rate of industry, industrialization, must be higher than the rate of population growth. He cited India as an example, in particular, which in the fifties, sixties and seventies developed at an insufficient pace. And in particular Russia, in which the rate of industrial growth was lower than the rate of demographic growth. This concerned not only the disproportion between the village and the city, but in the countryside all agrarian problems even intensified. Not many times, but intensified. The amount of land the peasant has, it has decreased. Those. we can say that all those prerequisites that were before the first Russian revolution, before the second and Civil, they were already with some coefficient. Moreover, multiplied by the historical drama of the suppression of the first Russian revolution during the Stolypin period. The second point is even greater social stratification, associated with the appearance of cuts, the kulaks. And the stratification that took place, it really led to the fact that the number of farm laborers, kulaks increased and this created a certain basis for an explosion in the village.
Moreover, there is such a well-known sociologist – Teodor Shanin, he has a very interesting book “REVOLUTION AS A MOMENT OF TRUTH: RUSSIA 1905-1907 – 1917-1922”, in which he promotes the idea that it was a peasant revolution of 1905, 1917 . and it ended in 1921-1922 with the introduction of the tax in kind and other reforms of the NEP. With this, the peasants won their peasant war.
Therefore, staged by Theodor Shanin, Edward Carr, the Stolypin reforms did not improve the situation, but led to the radicalization of the peasant movement, preparing a social base in the future and predetermined the choice of the peasants in favor of the Bolsheviks, in the end.
Those. Indeed, these reforms paved the way for the victory of the Left, the Bolsheviks.
Yuri Chekalin: When you turned to the issue of terror, what was the most unexpected thing for you?
Ilya Ratkovsky: In the eighties, I had a topic related to the Cheka and the Red Terror. During this period, I read 5-7 books a week, and in the evenings and on weekends I went to the Public Library of Leningrad and there I looked through newspaper files for 1917-18. This material was little used and processing it gave not only statistics – more than 5 thousand executions of the Cheka in the 18th year, but also made it possible to draw certain social conclusions about the nature, direction of terror, about the discussions that were held about it, about the fight against abuse Chekists (including executions of people who took part in some transactions and other violations). Those. it was immediately clear that many aspects were not considered, or were simplified. On this basis, I defended my diploma on this topic and entered the graduate school of St. Petersburg State University, while simultaneously working as a teacher at school (and a year later at the university).
Then he defended his Ph.D. in 1996. Here I was attracted by the materials of the St. Petersburg archives. It turned out that there were not so many contradictions. Those. many conclusions they only confirmed.
Naturally, in the future, considering the problems of the Red Terror and the activities of the Cheka in various periods, I came up with the topic of the White Terror, because these topics are interconnected. Many phenomena that are on the one hand, red, they are also characteristic of whites. And the result of studying these materials was my numerous articles, publications on the history of the White Terror.
At the same time, of course, I was interested in the people who led the punitive actions. Therefore, for example, I have published a book about Dzerzhinsky, well, and perhaps books will be published about figures already from the white side, as conductors of the punitive policy of the whites.
Thus, one theme, it always pulls several, providing access to a new level.
Yuri Chekalin: You divide terror into broad and pinpoint terror. What do you think it was like for whites?
Ilya Ratkovsky: It is unequivocally difficult to answer here, because the scientific study of the White Terror has a lesser tradition, a lot still needs to be clarified. It can be immediately noted that the White Terror is characterized by military-administrative terror, i.e. it, of course, can be considered as a point. There is a system of orders that empowers the military administration to carry out repression. For example, there are orders from April-March 1919 by Kolchak and they give not only individual people the authority to carry out uprisings, but also the military administration in general, the right to independently conduct repressions. What the Reds carried out through the Cheka and through the Revolutionary Trebunals in 1919, the Whites through military agencies, which, of course, are supplemented by counterintelligence agencies that are subordinate to them. In addition, with regard to pinpoint terror, there is also mass terror, not limited by any orders. This is basically a repressive practice after the occupation of the territory – cleaning it from the opposing social element, including both Soviet workers, sailors, and representatives of different nationalities: Jews, Latvians, Hungarians … Even certain professional groups fell under the purges: loaders, trade union workers etc. Here terror takes on the character of social revenge. Those. the same phenomena are characteristic of the white terror. If, say, we can talk about the social orientation of the Red Terror, then we can also talk about the social orientation of the White Terror. It was aimed at the peasantry no less than that of the Bolsheviks. And the Siberian peasantry, the peasantry of Ukraine, they became a victim of terror even to a greater extent. Here and requisitions, and requisitions, and the suppression of peasant uprisings. Those. social orientation is presented very seriously.
Yuri Chekalin: The historian of the white movement, Khandorin, in a conversation with me, speaking about Kolchak, insisted that he personally was against terror, that the excesses were not his fault. For example, when I reminded him of the admiral’s famous order about hostages, he replied as follows: “Let me remind you that we are talking about the text of Kolchak’s famous order to suppress the Yenisei uprising, the publications of which suggest that the hostage clauses were added when passing along the chain from the Supreme Ruler through the Minister of War Stepanov to the commander of the Irkutsk military district Artemiev, and already to them – to the same Rozanov (as A.A. Nemirovsky showed by comparing the texts of the republics) “.
Ilya Ratkovsky: This has a basis, but not in the same interpretation as Khandorin. This chain has been around for a long time. Those. transmission from upstream to downstream. But it is characteristic, firstly, that everywhere in this chain it is said that the Supreme Commander, the legislator, refers to the experience of Japan. The starting point is the Japanese experience of suppressing not only the peasants, but also the partisans in the first place. There are a number of precedents here. And the Japanese experience included not only the destruction of rebellious villages, but also the taking of hostages, etc. Those. already initially referring to this experience, she refutes Handorin. And these are the words of Kolchak. Once.
Second. The fact is that when transmitting an order, as a result, some differences may appear and one can agree with this, but the main points, including hostage taking, are mentioned at all stages. In addition, this is a feature of the document, when not only commas, but the entire text can be slightly adjusted. But it is characteristic that these March orders will be supplemented by the May one, in which Kolchak will transfer all powers to carry out punitive practices to the generals. He will approve the actions of not only specific generals, but the process itself. Those. he is responsible for everything that happened not only from March-April, but also for the previous practice. Here, the situation with the Omsk uprising in December 1918 is characteristic. When some indicate that Kolchak was ill, was not in the know, then he was horrified, but he could not do anything – this is ridiculous. Leaving aside Kolchak’s illness, because Lenin was not sick, but was seriously injured during the Red Terror, but no one says that he is not responsible for this. It is more interesting to see how Kolchak reacted to the activities of the main participants in the suppression of the uprising. We will see that the man who shot the members of the Constituent Assembly, who were released and returned to prison, received an order for promotion in the month of January, signed by Kolchak. The rest of the participants in these actions also went to promotion, or received new powers. Those. none of the participants in the suppression lost, but only acquired, and all this signed by Kolchak. This is his zi-qi-ya. Putting things in order was then appropriately formalized in the form of a system of awards. And then this system will continue when we see that Annenkov, having brutally suppressed the uprising in Semirechye, will then receive a new title and a thank-you telegram from Kolchak.
This all the time accompanies the reign of the admiral. And if we talk about the topic of Kolchak and terror, then Kolchak largely supported this practice, approved this practice and rewarded this practice.
Here Khandorin greatly simplifies the situation with the March orders. Those. there really are two orders, one will be valid until the summer, until the Yeniseev uprising and other uprisings nearby. Moreover, all references to the implementer of this order, General Rozanov, will be sure to Kolchak and Kolchak will never pull him up. Moreover, Khandorin and I also crossed paths, I pointed out an attempt to cancel Rozanov’s order by the government, and not by the admiral himself. This issue was previously considered by the government and, moreover, it was decided to cancel it, but Kolchak himself, who stood above the government, canceled their decision. Those. here you can see the full approval of such a practice. And after the suppression, yes, this order was canceled in the summer, but if you look at the entire practice, it can be noted that similar orders were given.
Yuri Chekalin: Khandorin continues to insist that Kolchak canceled the order, not Rozanov …
Ilya Ratkovsky: No, it was Rozanov who did it, and Kolchak theoretically could have canceled the abolition, but the suppression has already taken place. There was another order from Rozanov about hostages. More private, here with him there was a cancellation. But at the same time, another order continued to operate, another military order, which Khandorin does not mention. All this in one document. Neither General Rozanov nor the government could cancel Kolchak’s order. And they didn’t cancel it. There will be other orders of Kolchak later, connected in these areas with the deprivation of land allotments, persons who raised an uprising, etc. And in the summer the suppression took place, the award took place and Rozanov had the opportunity to cancel his decree and canceled it.
The fact is that Khandorin’s research is focused on Kolchak’s cadet entourage. And of course, the Cadets are not the party of the White Terror, basically. And Khandorin follows his heroes, i.e. recognizing the liberalism of the Cadets, he transfers this uncritically to the white movement, and then to Kolchak. Those. these are mainly the sources that he dealt with: this is the government, these are party and public circles around Kolchak, and it is clear that the admiral’s punitive and repressive policy is not entirely his topic. At the moment, of course. He has interesting publications, but these publications are joint with the historian Kermel, who worked a lot on military counterintelligence and intelligence in general. But again, this is work on the specified body that does not take into account the practice of military repressions, generals’ repressions. Each historian has his own vulnerabilities, Khandorin has it connected with this topic.
Yuri Chekalin: What are the main differences from the White and Red Terror of the Greens?
Ilya Ratkovsky: I studied this issue, but not in a specialized way, because in general the concept of a third force and green terror is more vague. Those. what is green terror, for example, in the Kuban? These are detachments of the left in the main direction, whose partisan terror is firstly directed against the local administration and secondly, anti-requisitioning: against the seizure of food and material resources. A similar situation is with the green terror in the Crimea, which at first, before the collapse of Wrangel, was anti-white. For whites and reds, the fight against the greens is a fight against the partisans, against the anti-state phenomenon. And if we consider the green terror in more detail, as is sometimes done with Makhno, then here we see territoriality and an attempt to build some kind of state practice, the practice of anarchism. There is also a social element here. This is a confrontation between the top and the bottom, workers and, relatively speaking, parasites. Makhno had a special attitude towards officers, and the Makhnovists even more so. Therefore, Makhno officers were shot. And although some field commanders had contact with the White Army, Makhno himself was against this. Those. there was such unregulated terror.
The green movement has some orders, some system of organs is not very typical. There was counterintelligence, but basically the practice went through gatherings of the population – the territory was occupied, the population was asked and identified accomplices of the former circles, and then they were destroyed in an independent manner. Those. there was no systematic terror. There was no command and other practice. It was more of a social phenomenon. I’m talking about green terror in relation to partisan detachments. For example, Rogovtsy (Siberian partisans) – who are they? Red? Only formally. They again see lynching and social practice of reprisals.
The green terror, to put it simply, is a variant of Pugachevism. Destruction of opponents, leaders, but without the organization of any regulations, concentration camps, etc.
Yuri Chekalin: Among the interventionists, who was the most cruel in terms of terror?
Ilya Ratkovsky: This is a more chronological and geographical issue. If we are talking about the Japanese, then this is the nineteenth year, not the eighteenth. Yes, in the 18th they will, together with the Cossacks, participate in the capture of cities, for example, Khabarovsk, but the practice of terror is a later one – the 19th year and beyond. It is connected with the fact that the Cossacks, who already in the 18th did not cope well with this task, turned out to be unsuitable for suppressing the insurgent movement. Therefore, the Japanese intervened in this process. In the Far East, if we talk about quantitative order, then comparison with the Czechs, Americans, Poles, the Japanese pursued a policy of terror more harshly. But for them it is a somewhat different policy. It was rather military terror and military repression. I would not say that there was a social orientation of terror.
As for the Americans in the same region, their position was, if not equidistant, but ambiguous. On the one hand, there were cases that the Americans took part in the suppression, on the other hand, they were sometimes involved in the conflict on the side of some partisan formations. They opposed the Cossack leaders: Kalmykov, Semyonov (to a lesser extent). And the Japanese were behind Kalmykov. Therefore, it is difficult to say whether the Americans were for the population or against the Japanese.
As for terror as a system, then, probably, to a greater extent, the British. This is the construction of concentration camps in the North of Russia, this is a certain support for this process in the East, and, finally, involvement in some acts of terror on the outskirts of Russia: in Central Asia … I.e. the role of the British as a driving force in the process of the military and punitive structures of the whites is great.
It is clear that there are French, Czechs, Poles. In Siberia, this is a multinational process. Many countries took part. But I would single out Great Britain in the first place and the Japanese in the Far East. Japan turned out to be too connected with its allies and was forced to support the Cossacks in their conflict with the peasantry, cover the chieftainship and hold back the offensive in the 20th year.
Yuri Chekalin: When did the White and Red Terror peak?
Ilya Ratkovsky: The peak of the white and red terror is the 19th year. But this is if we leave aside the Crimean executions. However, it was not so much the peak as the final point. And if we consider the practice of terror as intimidation, military and social factors, then this is the 19th year, the summer of the 19th year. For the same Bolsheviks, Ukraine can be mentioned. Whites also have Ukraine, other territories. The 19th year is the result of military and state confrontation and, as a result, the peak of the white and red terror. Not the 18th, not the 20th, but precisely during this period.
Yuri Chekalin: About Crimea. How do you assess those events: as a tragedy, or as a necessity? What is the role of Zemlyachka in those executions?
Ilya Ratkovsky: Mass executions are definitely a tragedy, because such figures cannot be justified by the guilt of all 8-12 thousand. It was a shooting, which was of the nature of a summary trial, so guilt-innocence was often simply not considered here. This is a tragedy. A tragedy not only of the white officers, but of the entire Civil War.
The Civil War is a tragedy itself, and the tragedy of the Crimea must be considered in relation to the tragedy of the Civil War. The events that took place in that period, they were to a large extent predetermined by the practice of the same whites. I mentioned the memoirs of the Drozdovites – Kravchenko, and not only, also his boss, General Turkul – they write about the destruction of more than two thousand people during the summer-autumn offensive of 1920. Only among the Drozdovites. These are the captured Chinese, and the red cadets, these are other representatives of the red formations. And this is only among the Drozdovites. It was a tough, monarchist division. How much was destroyed during the sortie from the Crimea is not an ordinary question. We are talking about 5-6-7 thousand and even more. It is clear that the Reds had a tough attitude towards the white officers. And the Crimean executions must be taken incl. as responses to former white practice. Another thing is that, as often happens, those who shoot then leave on a ship to the Princes’ Islands, to Constantinople, and other officers remain here. But for those who came, there was no difference between a white Drozdovite officer and one who had finished serving.
The Crimean executions were somehow predetermined. Predetermined by the practice of ending the Civil War. Wherever the Civil War is, it ends harshly enough. If we consider the Paris Commune, Spain, Ireland, then there the final peak of executions fell just at this time. There are a lot of similarities. Again, Crimea is a peninsula, a closed territory, and in closed territories the situation is always the least controlled.
As for the Countryman. There are memories of Dzerzhinsky that he said: “We made a mistake with the people who were sent there.” Obviously, he meant more Bela Kun. If we talk about who is most responsible for decisions, then it is he. It should also be added that they will be recalled quickly enough and a smaller part of the executions will be carried out with them. This time. And secondly, the repressions were not at the level of party bodies, if we talk about Zemlyachka, but at the level of Special Departments, Extraordinary Commissions. In this regard, how influential was Zemlyachka? She could signal to Moscow, and in this respect, perhaps, she is to blame. That she did not stop this practice or did not try to correct it. But again, there is no data on her behavior during this period. Those all those party leaders who signaled to Moscow, they exaggerated, Zemlyachka could somehow change the situation, but she did it.
But the repressions went first of all through the Chekists Evdokimov and Maltsev, through them in the first place, through the local Chekists, who in a year will be subject to the procedure of filtering the composition. Not only the Crimea, but also the Odessa Cheka – many of them will be fired, and some will be shot. Dzerzhinsky will even give instructions to publish a book about this practice in order to prevent such a situation. This is an action of local Chekists and military figures, which, in principle, was not public. We did more than expected. Cleaning was planned, but not on such a scale.
Yuri Chekalin: What was the reason for the confrontation between Kamenev and Dzerzhinsky for a long period?
Ilya Ratkovskoy: I think this was largely determined by two factors: the first is a personal position. If we look at the situation in 1917, then Kamenev’s position can be reduced to three points:
a). Attempt to prevent performance;
b). Protection of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee as a coalition body;
in). Kamenev’s initiative to abolish the death penalty.
Sometimes the Decree on Peace is called the first decree, but this is not so. The first decree was the Decree on the Abolition of the Death Penalty, the one that was introduced on July 12, 1917.
Kamenev called for the abolition, he was supported, although Lenin and Trotsky said that this was a premature measure.
Those. we see that Kamenev is consistent in his search for compromises, legal norms, and so on. Further, with his return from captivity to a post in the Moscow Soviet, here in Moscow, the Red Terror will be more limited and interrupted earlier than elsewhere. It was Kamenev, whom Ryazanov supported during this period. And when Ryazanov arrives in Petrograd in mid-September, he will say that “we have already stopped the terror. And you still have this here” … I.e. this is Kamenev’s personal position. But this position was reinforced by his position. He himself is a representative of the soviets; structures that tried to protect themselves from any influence of the Cheka, “chekism”. Not only execution practice, but also crimes in office, etc. Therefore, Kamenev is a consistent supporter of amnesties and the reform of the Cheka. Along with Stalin, by the way. Stalin was also not a supporter of the KGB practice, and in 1919 he considered the possibility of transferring the execution practice from the Cheka to the system of revolutionary tribunals. And Kamenev was one of those Bolsheviks who opposed the practice of mass executions, etc. Along with Ryazanov. By the way, this is an important point, because in certain circles a line is being drawn about the responsibility of the Jews for the Srvetian punitive practice. They name Zinoviev, Sverdlov, Trotsky, but there is another row here, and here Ryazanov, Kamenev are opponents of terror. Those. this shows that it is impossible to single out any nationality in carrying out this practice. And Kamenev’s position is his own, plus the body that stood behind him – the Moscow City Council.
Yuri Chekalin: At that time, there were different groups in general…
Ilya Ratkovsky: Yes, Sergey Sergeevich Voitikov writes about this in his book. You can criticize something there, the fact is that when we talk about Sverdlov and the group of radicals who supported him, etc., it is important to change the personnel.
Here Sverdlov dies, and at that moment Peters leaves the Cheka for the system of tribunals, the head of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Petrovsky, is removed from his post and Dzerzhinsky is appointed in his place. Petrovsky is exiled to Ukraine. And Petrovsky and Sverdlov were close even as families. Danishevsky, the head of the military tribunals, leaves. And Danishevsky was also close to Sverdlov and Trotsky. We can talk about the earlier departure of Podvoisky. He headed the former War Ministry, then the Higher Military Inspectorate (VVI), and at the end of the year he was sent to Ukraine, into exile. Moreover, despite attempts to somehow agree with Lenin, to meet … And when Sverdlov dies, he generally disappears from the horizon. Yagoda from the VVI goes to the Cheka. And Yagoda is a relative of Sverdlov. Those. there was a whole series of permutations. Personally, I believe that such a military and party leader, M.S., was also associated with Sverdlov. Kedrov (later a prominent Chekist), but Voitikov does not agree with this, here we disagree. Kedrov and Podvoisky are relatives through their wives and often performed together.
Therefore, certainly groups existed during this period. Of course, Voitikov himself does not believe that Sverdlov was behind the assassination attempt on Lenin, one should not exaggerate here, but there is an interesting fact that at that time he tried to take more power for himself.
Naturally, there are different shades of the practice of repression. Sverdlov was such a tough option. Lenin is rather “Ordnung”, i.e. order. If necessary, then you need to carry out, if not necessary, then you can do without. If Lenin sometimes wrote “to shoot” and it simply remained on paper (the message to the revolutionary order was more important), then Sverdlov’s orders were unconditionally carried out and he followed this.
Yuri Chekalin: How do you feel about the demolition of the monument to Dzerzhinsky and would you return it to its original place, if you had such an opportunity?
Ilya Ratkovsky: The demolition of the monument had a symbolic character, i.e. was a consolidation of the results of those events and a certain challenge to the state security structures. It was sort of a test. Because before the eyes of the KGB, the monument to the founder was demolished, but those who were then in the KGB preferred not to interfere – perhaps they already cared about their future. Note that it was not Lenin who was demolished, but Dzerzhinsky. In my opinion, it was necessary for the protesters. Finish something, throw out energy. On the other hand, this had negative consequences, since it further split the society, put the KGB, and the special services in general, in an ambiguous position.
A well-known journalist at that time, Latsis, said that even if it was necessary to demolish the monument here, then it was necessary to put (relocate) it to VDNKh, etc. Dzerzhinsky was one of the leaders of the NEP.
If it were my will, I would return it to its place. It is tied to one place and symbolized a lot. But how ready society is and how much it will distract from more important problems … In our country, disputes about the monument to Dzerzhinsky begin when it is necessary either to distract from something, or to conduct a kind of clarification of the opinion of society. If there is more Dzerzhinsky, then the government needs to take some kind of anti-corruption measures, if there is less, then everything is fine. Therefore, I would not rush, but at some point I would support the decision to return the monument. But that’s my personal opinion.
Yuri Chekalin: Thank you for the detailed answers.
Ilya Ratkovsky: Thank you.
Klim Zhukov
Vladimir Morozov
Alexander Palladin
