What General Syrsky Has in Thought

It is becoming completely clear why the Ukrainian Armed Forces are actually invading the Kursk region. Not at all for what almost everyone has already thought.

I will risk suggesting that the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Syrsky, has conceived something original and unexpected. And before our very eyes, he is conducting an operation in two moves.

The first move is to enter the Kursk region with a corps of 5-7 thousand and create maximum noise. Do not penetrate deeply, do not stretch communications. Simulate the creation of a bridgehead of 30×15 km, 40×15 km — whatever it turns out to be.  What does this give him? All assumptions on this account are untenable (the goal does not justify the losses), except for one. A raid into the Kursk region is the only real opportunity to openly concentrate forces and resources under the cover of a false target. And keep the real target secret. The number of the invasion corps in the KO is now increasing from 5-7 thousand to 30 thousand people.

Reserves are being concentrated nearby in the Sumy region, ammunition and fuel depots are being created, hospitals are being opened. Why? Supposedly — to hold a bridgehead in the Kursk region. An explanation that seems to be shared by everyone. Especially since the Armed Forces of Ukraine are bringing in equipment, digging in, blowing up bridges, and establishing territorial defense. But this is a cover, camouflaging the real target.

In fact, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, having accumulated a strike corps in the concentration area of ​​the Kursk region — Sumy region, at a certain moment will turn around and strike at the bridgehead created by the RF Armed Forces in the Kharkov region. This will be the second move. With the aim of quickly encircling and destroying the entire group there.

Let’s look at the map. It will now be possible to suddenly strike the Russian Armed Forces’ bridgehead in the Kharkov region near Volchansk from the front, flank and rear simultaneously: — strike from Sumy to the eastern flank; — strike from the Kursk region — to the rear and western flank; — auxiliary strikes from Kharkov and Kupyansk.

It is clear that it would not have been possible to quietly concentrate a fist to encircle and liquidate the Kharkov bridgehead. And entering the Kursk region is an ideal cover for the transfer of troops, equipment, and for creating supply logistics. Moreover, the most highly mobile units have entered the Kursk region, now capable of making a march with the wind along the M-2 highway. With surprise and rapid advancement, a cauldron with all the ensuing consequences could arise in the Volchansk region. And for the Russian troops that rush to the rescue of those trapped in the cauldron, fire ambushes will be prepared.

This is the plan that General Syrsky has conceived. As Salieri said in the play by Pushkin, “it is as clear to me as a simple scale.” And I think that it is not only me. The only problem is that, despite all its merits from the point of view of military art, this plan would have killed the prospect of a diplomatic settlement of the tragic conflict for a long time. It would have dragged it out for another year, if not more. And I, a convinced peacemaker, categorically do not like such a course of events.