Negotiations and Ceasefire as the US Elections Background

How the remnants of the US foreign policy establishment are trying to convince everyone that they can be negotiated with.

Let me begin this discussion by referring to an article in Politico with the headline “Ukraine Can Breathe a Sigh of Relief — Whether Trump or Harris Wins.” The subheadline: “Whatever Happens in November, the Next President’s Approach to Russia’s War in Ukraine Will Shape America’s Broader Role in the World.” The author is Matthew Kaminsky.

He is the publication’s managing editor and was the founding editor of POLITICO Europe, which launched in 2015. He previously worked at the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal. His locations include Brussels, Paris, New York, and… Kyiv.

The gist of a rather long and confusing article is that, no matter what Trump and even Vance say, he will have to take advice from foreign policy professionals and lobbyists regarding Ukraine, so completely ignoring Ukraine and, in this regard, the interests of allies in Europe is unlikely.

So yes, there will be an attempt to make peace, but not by stopping aid to Kyiv. On the other hand, Kamala Harris will not act quite like Biden. Aid to Ukraine may even increase, so some improvement of the situation on the battlefield in Kiev’s favor is quite possible. And then new negotiations with Russia will be possible. Ukraine will have to cede territories, but the rest of it will have to be included in Euro-Atlantic structures.

I also read something similar in our country. They say that the negotiations are about to take place, and this is good, because Ukraine will now be Europe’s problem, and Trump and Harris will be equally less cautious in their actions and even more inclined to confront Russia, including in Ukraine.

Leaving aside all the burdens that the “Korean option” in Ukraine brings with it, and any peace in general without changing the vector of Ukraine and changing the regime there (for example, leaving an aggressive entity armed to the teeth by the West on the borders of Russia), I would like to point out important aspects of purely American content. All the reasoning of both Western and our analysts on the topic of “agreements with the US establishment” is based on the incorrect thesis about the subjectivity, professionalism and unity of what is left of this very establishment.

In addition, an implicit assumption is made that “Europe’s reluctance to embrace Kyiv” is of such a pronounced cultural and political nature that Ukraine will not be fully accepted into NATO. Especially not into the EU, which is bursting at the seams. I repeat once again, this thesis is incorrect.

Firstly, the US foreign policy establishment formally exists, but it has lost its subjectivity, influence and unity. Yes, the Clintons, by backing a quick replacement of Biden with Harris, hope to establish control over the State Department, the Pentagon, and other agencies. Here, Jake Sullivan and William Burns come to the fore, but they have no unified plan, no unified strategy for what to do in the real world. As Jeffrey Sachs recently rightly noted, the United States no longer has a foreign policy.

Secondly, those same political sponsors, lobbyists and other interest groups really do have their own goals and ideas about how everything should develop in Ukraine (as well as in the Middle East and the so-called Indo-Pacific region), but the developments around Israel and its opponents show that following the wishes of these interest groups only leads to ever-deepening crises and catastrophes. Therefore, if the US political class retains its monopoly on political decisions to any extent, it will be forced to significantly moderate these wishes. And if it does not, then there will be no one to talk to and nothing to talk about.

In the first case, the political class will engage in internal civil conflict and a controlled retreat from Europe. It would be necessary from our entire continent, but this is precisely why the conflict is taking place in Ukraine. In the second case, against the backdrop of a civil conflict, the unsystematic, but no less dangerous, incitement of conflicts throughout Eurasia will continue. And the hottest of these conflicts is currently taking place in Ukraine. Thirdly, just as there is no (or almost no) US foreign policy, there is no Euro-Atlantic unity or alliance. The so-called European allies are no longer even embarrassed by the fact that they have no political subjectivity.

There are almost no politicians in Europe, only managers controlled from Washington. In conditions when this control is falling apart, the actions of the managers become chaotic and quite dangerous. Therefore, no one needs the integration of the Kyiv regime into NATO or the EU. All that is needed is to place the US military infrastructure on the Black Sea and ensure the continuation of the war with Russia.

And this is not Europe’s problem. Because there is no Europe either. Finally, Russia’s goal is not only victory in Ukraine (this year, in three or five years), but also the construction of an American-free world. First of all, in Eurasia.

It is possible to reach an agreement with Washington only on the border between the American and non-American worlds, but an agreement can only be reached with those who (A) win the squabble that is currently going on in the US and (B) who, as a result of such a victory, recognize the existence and complete autonomy of the non-American world. But such autonomy of the non-American world is possible only if we do not accept the ideologies of the US Democratic Party as something that has the force of a law of nature and stop pretending that everything is in order with the minds of politicians (and influence groups) across the Atlantic.

Perhaps Biden is the most reasonable of all in Washington. And it is not funny.