Why Was Trotsky Killed?

Throughout the 1930s, Trotsky and his supporters waged relentless attacks on the Soviet leadership and the Comintern.

The goal of these attacks, regardless of the accusations against Stalin, slogans, and theoretical postulates advanced, was essentially the same: to remove the moderate wing of the Bolshevik Party, led by Stalin, from power in the USSR, transfer power to the ultra-left forces led by Trotsky, who advocated “permanent revolution,” and subordinate the international communist movement to these forces.

However, the Trotskyists failed to achieve success. The potential of the “left opposition” in the USSR and the Comintern leadership was significantly weakened by repression. Trotskyism failed to win over the majority of members of the existing Communist Parties and the broad masses in the USSR and the West. Only a portion of the communist youth succumbed to the ultra-left slogans, forming the basis of independent Trotskyist-oriented parties that emerged in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and a number of other countries.

The growing threat of a new world war gave Trotsky and his supporters great hope that they would ultimately achieve their goal. Just as the First World War had sparked a powerful upsurge in the revolutionary movement, the Trotskyists believed that a new war would trigger a revolutionary explosion in many countries, and perhaps even on a global scale.

Under wartime conditions, they predicted, the parties of the Communist International, like the parties of the Second International, would inevitably slide into nationalist patriotism, and the proletariat would turn away from them and support “genuinely revolutionary parties”—organizations with a Trotskyist orientation. It was in anticipation of such a development that Trotsky and his supporters in 1938 pushed ahead with the creation of the Fourth International, declaring that under its leadership, in the very near future, “revolutionary millions will be able to storm heaven and earth.”

Trotsky believed that war and world revolution would also serve as a purifying fire for socialism in the USSR, liberating it from the shackles of Stalin’s “bureaucratic absolutism.” While declaring the need to defend the “economic foundations of the USSR,” Trotsky simultaneously emphasized that “only an international revolution” could save the USSR for socialism, meaning its involvement in war. It was war that would lead to a “political revolution” in the Soviet Union.[16]

The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, which allowed the USSR to remain outside the war, dealt a very significant blow to the calculations of Trotsky and his supporters. It is no coincidence that he was harshly attacked by them. It is worth noting that Trotskyists remain his staunch critics to this day. In a series of articles published in the Bulletin of the Opposition, Trotsky’s main publication, and in the Western press, Trotskyists sharply criticized the treaty and attempted to prove that the Soviet Union was not a neutral state, but a military ally of Hitler.[17]

This position became especially clear during the Soviet-Finnish War. In an article published in January 1940 in the American magazine Liberty, Trotsky bluntly stated: “The Kremlin has harnessed itself to the chariot of German imperialism, and Germany’s enemies have thereby become Russia’s enemies. As long as Hitler remains strong—and he is very strong—Stalin will remain his satellite.”[18]

Such statements were clearly provocative, especially since they were made at a time when England and France were debating how to further develop relations with the USSR, and there were highly influential political forces prepared to use the Soviet-Finnish War to exert pressure on the Soviet Union and even launch a military attack.

Specifically, plans were being made to bomb and possibly occupy the USSR’s oil centers in the Transcaucasus and send a 150,000-strong expeditionary force to Finland. The possibility of subsequently transferring military operations from Finnish territory to the northwestern regions of the USSR was also being considered.

According to Western strategists, military pressure was intended to induce the Kremlin to change its foreign policy course, embrace cooperation with the Anglo-French alliance, and declare war on Germany. Another option, incidentally, was also being considered, which Moscow feared most.

Britain and France’s declaration of war on the Soviet Union could have led to their signing of peace with Germany (the “Phoney War” was still ongoing in the West, and a peace agreement with the “Third Reich” was actively sought) and their joint action against the USSR.[19] It was precisely this “possible aggression of united imperialist forces” that Siqueiros had in mind in his memoirs.

The goals of the Trotskyists and the leaders of the Anglo-French coalition—to bring the USSR into the war—coincided during this period. This, apparently, is what prompted politicians in London and Paris to consider the necessity and possibility of using Trotsky and his supporters for their own ends. With the help of the Trotskyists, they hoped to organize a political coup in the USSR and remove Stalin from power.

The possibility of transferring Trotsky himself to the USSR to lead the “revolutionary movement” was also considered. Those who made such plans clearly had in mind the example of the German government’s actions in 1917, when it facilitated the return of Vladimir Lenin and his associates to Russia. As a result of the revolution they carried out, Russia withdrew from the war, and Germany was spared the need to fight on two fronts.[20]

In late 1939 and early 1940, politicians in England and France, using the same method, but with Trotsky’s help, hoped to achieve the exact opposite goal: drawing the USSR into the war and forcing Germany to fight on two fronts.

It should be noted that the idea of ​​using Trotsky in the struggle against the USSR during this period was not limited to politicians in England and France. In December 1939, for example, the Finnish State Council openly discussed the formation of a “Russian alternative government” headed by Trotsky or A.F. Kerensky.[21]

We present excerpts from two documents stored in the Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry.

The German consul in Geneva reported to the military intelligence department of the Foreign Ministry in Berlin:

“German Consulate

Geneva, January 8, 1940

No.62

… In connection with the information presented in previous reports regarding the concentration of troops (Anglo-French – Yu. Ch.) in Syria, the following reports and rumors, transmitted here by agents from France and Geneva, will likely also be of interest. According to them, England intends to launch a surprise attack not only on Russian oil regions, but will also attempt to simultaneously deprive Germany of Romanian oil sources in the Balkans.

… An agent in France reports that the British are planning to establish contact with Trotsky’s people in Russia itself through Trotsky’s group in France and attempt to organize a putsch against Stalin. These coup attempts should be seen as closely connected with the British intention to seize control of Russian oil sources.

A few days later, SS Oberführer R. Likus, who was in charge of processing intelligence coming through intelligence channels in the minister’s “personal staff,” placed the following intelligence report, received from Geneva, on the desk of German Foreign Minister J. von Ribbentrop:

“Geneva has secretly reported on British plans to disrupt oil supplies to Germany and Russia:

The British side wants to attempt to cut off the Russians from oil sources and simultaneously intends to exert influence on Romania in one form or another and, by provoking a conflict in the Balkans, deprive Germany of oil supplies. By cutting off the USSR and Germany from oil… (the British – Yu. Ch.) hope to quickly and radically resolve the problem; it is assumed that, in the sharply worsened circumstances, these countries will move to open warfare against each other…

Next, the British side will attempt to mobilize Trotsky’s group, that is, the Fourth International, and somehow transfer it to Russia. Agents in Paris report that Trotsky, with the help of the British, will have to return to Russia to organize a putsch against Stalin. It is difficult to judge the extent to which these plans can be realized from here (from Geneva – Yu. Ch.).

Berlin, January 17, 1940

L[ikus]”[22]

There is no doubt about the veracity of the information contained in the cited reports. Ribbentrop’s “personal staff” meticulously double-checked foreign intelligence reports and included them in intelligence reports for submission to higher-ups (not only to Ribbentrop but also to Hitler) only if their veracity was beyond doubt.

It should also be noted that the information on other points contained in the cited reports was entirely accurate. German documents indicating England and France’s plans for Trotsky and his “group” do not answer the question of how informed Trotsky himself was of these plans, or what his attitude toward them was.

At the same time, there is reason to believe that an offer from the government of some great power or coalition of powers, with their assistance, to return to the USSR at an opportune moment to lead the struggle against Stalin—had such an offer been made—might have been accepted by Trotsky. This is supported, not least, by his assessment of the circumstances of Lenin’s return to Russia.

Trotsky unequivocally characterized Lenin’s actions as a “bold decision,” as a skillful exploitation of the German authorities’ “false hopes” in the interests of the revolution, and believed that in this case there was a “complete correspondence” between the end and the means. He emphasized that imperialist circles could and should be used. In this case, it is only necessary, like Lenin, to stand firmly on the basis of a revolutionary program, not to enter into “any political agreements” with the imperialists, and to be “unconditionally honest and loyal in relation to the working class”.[24]

In early 1940, Trotsky was clearly preparing for some decisive events, as evidenced by his drafting of his political and personal wills. Their contents are undoubtedly of interest. A review of the wills leaves the impression that, in preparing them, Trotsky pursued a single goal: to convince those who would survive that he had been faithful to the revolutionary cause to the end and “unconditionally honest and devoted to the working class.”
“There is not a single stain on my revolutionary honor,” wrote Trotsky. “Neither directly nor indirectly have I ever entered into any behind-the-scenes agreements or even negotiations with the enemies of the working class… For forty-three years of my conscious life I remained a revolutionary, forty-two of which I fought under the banner of Marxism… I will die a proletarian revolutionary, a Marxist, a dialectical materialist, and, consequently, an irreconcilable atheist. “My faith in the communist future of humanity is no less ardent now, but stronger, than in the days of my youth.”[25]

The words with which he concludes his political testament are noteworthy: “Whatever the circumstances of my death, I will die with unshakable faith in the communist future.”[26]

What circumstances did Trotsky have in mind: death from an attack of hypertension, from which he suffered, or suicide as a way to end physical suffering? These are precisely the circumstances he emphasizes in his testament.

But what does this “unshakable faith in the communist future” have to do with it? Should Trotsky, who had earned fame as the “leader of the proletarian revolution,” have justified himself, if he died of hypertension, and argued that he had departed this life as a revolutionary fighter and communist? Apparently not.

Hypertension, as is well known, has no correlation with a person’s political views. Trotsky was by no means a decrepit old man, reduced to summing up his life and writing wills. He had only turned 60 in November 1939. He still felt strong, worked hard, and was immersed in the struggle and plans for the future, connected to what he considered the imminent world revolution.

The very act of writing a political will, insistently emphasizing his fidelity to the ideas of communism, could only have made sense for Trotsky if he were preparing to embark on an extremely dangerous undertaking, and the circumstances of his possible death could cast a shadow on him and call into question his affiliation with the party of the proletarian revolution.

The dates Trotsky wrote his wills are telling: February 27–March 3, 1940. It was during these days that England and France came closest to declaring war on the Soviet Union. The question of sending an expeditionary force of Western powers to Finland was practically decided. Part of this corps (French and Polish units) was ready to embark at any moment and land in northern Norway. London and Paris exerted powerful pressure on the governments of Norway and Sweden to obtain their consent to the passage of troops through their territories to Finland.

Preparations for an Anglo-French attack on Soviet Transcaucasia were in full swing.[27]

Simultaneously with this attack, the Western powers planned to stir up uprisings of nationalist and separatist forces in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The corresponding émigré organizations were involved in the preparation of these uprisings. A number of these organizations, as early as 1939 and 1940, addressed K. I. Hambro, the chairman of the 20th session of the League of Nations Assembly and the speaker of the Norwegian parliament, who had close ties to British political circles, with a provocative demand to pass a resolution condemning “Russia’s enslavement of small states” (primarily referring to Ukraine and Georgia).[28]

This was intended to create an international legal basis not only for official Western support for separatist forces in the USSR, but also for open foreign military intervention against it, with the aim of securing the rights and restoring the sovereignty of the “enslaved states.”

British and French politicians had no doubts about the success of their planned military and political actions and were firmly convinced that at the first serious test and the emergence of economic difficulties (the loss of oil reserves, which would lead to the paralysis of all Soviet industry and agriculture) and political problems (the activation of nationalist forces), the Stalinist regime would falter, and internal turmoil would begin in the USSR.

On February 22, 1940, General Michel-Grande Gamelin, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, predicted: “In a few months (after the Western powers’ plans are put into action – O.V.), the USSR could find itself in such a difficult situation that it will face complete collapse.”[29]

Trotsky and his supporters shared this view of the USSR, believing that the “ruling Soviet elite” lacked popular support, that the people would try to shake off the “yoke of the hated bureaucracy” at the first opportunity, and that a revolutionary situation had developed in the USSR, and that the slightest spark would ignite a new civil war. Trotskyists placed great hopes not only on the actions of external forces but also on the nationalist sentiments of the populations of individual Soviet republics.

As early as July 1939, Trotsky called for the creation of a “united, free, and independent Ukraine” and predicted, in the event of war, “national uprisings within the framework of a political revolution.”[30] On these issues, as we see, Trotsky and Western strategists demonstrated striking unanimity.

And yet, Trotsky and his entourage assigned a leading role in the impending events in the USSR to the “left” opposition. Trotsky was deeply convinced that this opposition represented a powerful force, and he hoped that at the right moment, at his signal, it would emerge from hiding and wage a struggle against Stalin.

Of course, opposition to Stalin’s leadership existed both in Russia and in the other republics that were part of the USSR. The extent of this organization and Trotsky’s influence on it are another matter. Although the Kremlin succeeded in neutralizing Trotsky’s overt and some hidden and potential supporters through repression in the 1930s, the problem of opposition, both “left” and “right,” remained. The collaboration of certain segments of the Soviet population during the Great Patriotic War is a clear example of this.

The Kremlin had good reason to fear (and this was clearly evident during the trials of 1936-1938) that Trotsky, as the leader and ideological guide of the “left,” could become a key figure in the formation of a broader bloc of “left” and “right” in a crisis, especially since many of their slogans and programmatic principles overlapped.

As for the existence of an organized “left” opposition in the USSR in the winter of 1939 and spring of 1940, such an opposition, though deeply clandestine, apparently did exist. Although it was unable to seize power, it possessed sufficient forces to organize isolated terrorist acts and acts of sabotage that could have destabilized the domestic political situation and had serious foreign policy consequences.

In this regard, a secret message from the chief of the German Security Police and SD, sent on April 3, 1940, to the German Foreign Ministry and from there forwarded to the German embassy in Moscow, is of interest. It reported that, according to reports from foreign intelligence sources, “much has been said recently about a left-wing radical opposition in the USSR.”

There is every reason to believe that “a left-wing radical opposition group is active in the Soviet Union, and its numbers are constantly growing.” The opposition “is planning an assassination attempt on Germans in Moscow with the goal of achieving a change in the Soviet Union’s foreign policy.”

The message emphasized the real danger that the opposition might attempt to repeat the events of July 1918, when German envoy Wilhelm von Mirbach was assassinated in Moscow. The German security service also did not rule out the possibility of the opposition carrying out a terrorist attack with the involvement of “foreign circles” who would become “a tool in its hands.”

It was noted that “foreign circles” should be understood as “leftists” from a number of Eastern European countries, primarily the Czech Republic. The Czech “leftists,” the German security service noted, “repeatedly expressed their extreme dissatisfaction with Stalin’s policies,” and had recently become frequent visitors to the Soviet consulate in Prague, apparently seeking entry into the USSR.[31]

Recall that among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it was in Czechoslovakia, as well as Austria and Poland, that Trotskyists once managed to gain certain positions. Their legal entry from these countries could have been one of the channels through which Western politicians planned to transfer the “Trotsky group” to the USSR.

Digression from the main topic of the narrative, it should be noted that the German authorities had ample grounds to expect trouble from the “left” opposition in the USSR, to consider it anti-German, and to associate this opposition with Trotsky. In Berlin, they well remembered Trotsky’s position during the negotiations for the Brest Peace and after the treaty was signed. There, it was clearly assessed as aimed at provoking a continuation of the war with Germany.[32]

They also did not forget in Berlin that Mirbach’s murderer, Ya. G. Blumkin, who belonged to the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party, had successfully “surfaced” in 1920 in Trotsky’s secretariat as one of his closest assistants. Incidentally, it should be noted that in 1929, Blumkin was executed after assuming the role of liaison between Trotsky, who was then in Turkey, and opposition representatives in the USSR.

The German authorities’ negative experiences with the “left” opposition in the USSR also included an incident that occurred in March 1932, when an assassination attempt was made in Moscow against another German ambassador, G. von Dirksen. By pure chance, the ambassador was unharmed, but embassy counselor F. von Twardowski sustained several wounds.

I. M. Stern, who carried out the assassination attempt, confessed during the investigation that he belonged to a “left” opposition group and that the assassination attempt was intended to provoke a conflict between Berlin and Moscow.

It should be noted that shortly before this, Germany had provided the USSR with a large loan for the purchase of German industrial products, and Stalin, in an interview with the German writer E. Ludwig (the pseudonym of E. L. Kohn, who emigrated from Germany to Switzerland in 1933), declared the USSR’s sympathy for Germany and its desire to maintain friendly relations with it, come what may.

In March 1940, the Trotskyists’ hopes of drawing the USSR into the war were dashed. The governments of Norway and Sweden refused to allow units of the Western Expeditionary Force to pass through their territory, and the ruling circles of Finland, after some hesitation, rejected aid from London and Paris.

The leadership of the Northern European countries was well aware of the catastrophe that their involvement in a “great war” would cause for the entire region. For its part, the Soviet government, seeking to avoid military conflict with the Western powers, began negotiations with Finland and signed a peace agreement on March 12, 1940.

However, the failure of plans to establish a front in Northern Europe did not force the ruling circles of London and Paris to abandon their plans to strike at the USSR. Military preparations in the south continued, and the wave of anti-Soviet sentiment continued unabated. In the second half of March 1940, France effectively terminated its trade agreement with the USSR and declared the Soviet envoy “persona non grata.”[34]

On March 16, Gamelin emphasized in a note to the “Military Plan for 1940”: “In general, the Russo-Finnish armistice does not require us to change our fundamental goals… on the contrary, it encourages us to act even more quickly and energetically.”[35]

The French military proposed launching an operation against Soviet Transcaucasia in late June or early July 1940.[36]

Did Trotsky know about these plans? On this matter, we can again only speculate. But once again, the coincidence of certain events is striking, suggesting that Trotsky had information on this matter and was preparing to act.

On April 17, 1940, the French military expressed its opinion on the possible timing of the bombing of Baku, Batumi, and the USSR’s Black Sea communications. A few days later, on April 25, Trotsky composed his famous appeal, “Letter to Soviet Workers,” in which he called on them to prepare for an armed uprising against “Cain Stalin and his clique.”[37]

The appeal was then printed as a specially formatted leaflet. Trotsky intended to deliver it to the USSR immediately after the USSR’s involvement in the war, which, in his firm conviction, would happen in the very near future.

Following this, in May 1940, Trotsky and his supporters adopted the “Manifesto on Imperialist War and Proletarian Revolution,” in which they openly proclaimed: “Preparing for the revolutionary overthrow of the Moscow rulers is one of the main tasks of the Fourth International.”[38]

Such a statement was tantamount to an official declaration of war on the government of the USSR.

There is no doubt that Moscow was well informed about the plans of certain circles in England and France to exploit the Trotskyists, as well as their calculations and actions. The “Soviet Section” of the Fourth International[39] was headed by NKVD agent M.G. Zborovsky (alias “Tulip”), who for several years reported in great detail to the Soviet government on what was happening at the organization’s headquarters in Paris.[40]

Some information apparently also came from the German authorities. Berlin was preparing a strike in Western Europe and needed a secure rear in the East. They tried to counter Anglo-French plans to the best of their ability and prevent Moscow from unexpectedly shifting its policy toward cooperation with London and Paris. German diplomacy missed no opportunity to once again point out to Moscow the hostile attitude of the Western powers toward it.

Through diplomatic channels, Berlin transmitted to the Kremlin in the winter of 1939–1940 information it had about the planned landing of a Western expeditionary force in Northern Norway and about Anglo-French plans for Soviet Transcaucasia.[41]

Apparently, the German embassy in Moscow, in order to ensure its own security, informed the Kremlin about the “radical left opposition” preparing assassination attempts on German representatives.

With the outbreak of active hostilities in Western Europe on May 10, 1940, the possibility of an Anglo-French attack in Transcaucasia and the Balkans increased dramatically. The Kremlin did not rule out the possibility that, in response to the Wehrmacht’s successful offensive, the Western powers might attempt to accelerate their plans to block oil supplies to Germany from Romania and the USSR.

The danger that London and Paris would intensify their efforts to create a second front against the Axis powers in Southeastern Europe also grew,[42] and, consequently, the threat of conspiracies and putsches inspired by them.

Under these circumstances, Trotskyism, aiming to prepare an armed uprising in the USSR and “overthrow the Moscow rulers,” became a genuine danger. This threat did not disappear even after the capitulation of France on June 22, 1940.

While the Anglo-German confrontation continued, the Soviet leadership was forced to reckon with the possibility that London might attempt to exploit Trotsky for its own military and political ends. The actions of Trotsky and his entourage gave the Kremlin more than enough grounds for such concerns in those days.

Immediately after the Wehrmacht began active military operations against the Western powers, on May 11, 1940, Trotsky publicized what he had kept secret just a few days earlier, intended for use on “Day X”—the “Letter to Soviet Workers.” It appeared in the pages of the Socialist Appeal.

Following this, the aforementioned Manifesto of the Fourth International was published. From that moment on, it seems, no one in the world had any doubt about who the Trotskyists were playing against, and what game they were playing.

On May 24, 1940, the first attempt to eliminate Trotsky was made, followed by a second in August of that year. In conclusion, it should be noted that in January 1940, when Moscow apparently learned of Anglo-French plans regarding the Trotskyists, the Soviet leadership attempted to enter into dialogue with Trotsky.

The German ambassador to Washington, G. Thomsen, reported to Berlin on January 22, 1940: over the past few weeks, rumors had persistently circulated in the American press about “Stalin’s desire to reach an agreement with Trotsky.” However, according to the ambassador, dialogue did not materialize. Trotsky published an article in Liberty magazine in which he denounced the USSR as Germany’s military ally. From that moment on, a tragic outcome was clearly inevitable.

On August 24, 1940, Pravda reported Trotsky’s death. The editorial was titled “The Death of an International Spy” and, according to many researchers, was penned by Stalin. One can debate and disagree with this characterization of Trotsky.

But it must be acknowledged that Trotsky was actively used by certain Western circles not only in the winter of 1939 and spring of 1940. The British and Americans had been counting on him as an opponent of a separate peace between Soviet Russia and Germany as early as 1917 and 1918. British intelligence officers such as S.J. Reilly and J.A. Hill were active in Trotsky’s entourage.

The latter, tasked with compelling Russia to continue the war against Germany and to establish an anti-German spy network, advised Trotsky and helped him create the Soviet Republic’s air force and military intelligence and counterintelligence systems. Reilly was involved not only in the infamous “Ambassadors’ Plot” but also in the Mirbach assassination and the assassination attempt on Lenin, whose place Trotsky was slated to take.

British intelligence agencies also supported Trotsky during his power struggle with Stalin. These facts have been repeatedly covered in studies by both foreign and Russian specialists in the history of intelligence services. Some information on this subject can also be gleaned from the memoirs of Hill.[44]

Thus, the Entente intelligence services had long accumulated experience “working” with Trotsky, and they considered it entirely possible to use the Trotskyists and their leader in their political schemes. As for the German and Japanese intelligence services, which had established ties with Trotsky in the second half of the 1920s and first half of the 1930s, these ties were effectively severed after the political trials of his supporters in the USSR in 1936–1938 and the revelations that emerged during them.

The “Lion of the Revolution,” taken overseas and taken under the care and protection of his American supporters, had to pin his hopes for the realization of his far-reaching political plans on the support of other partners.

[16] См.: Волкогонов Д.А. Троцкий: Политический портрет. Кн. 2, С. 335–336.

[17] В этом вопросе правая и «ультралевая» историография и сегодня обнаруживают поразительное единодушие.

[18] PA AA: Pol. V. Politische Beziehungen Rußlands zu Deutschland. Bd. 3 (R 104358), Bl. ohne Nummer (Pol. V 2131/40, Deutsche Botschaft in Washington an das AA Nr. 121 vom 22. Januar 1940).

[19] См.: Майский И.М. Воспоминания советского дипломата. 1925–1945 гг. М., 1971, С. 428 и сл.

[20] См.: Возвращение Ленина в Россию (документальные материалы). – Новая и новейшая история, 1990, № 3, С. 75–93; Halweg W. von. Lenins Rückkehr nach Rußland 1917. Leiden, 1957.

[21] Зимняя война 1939–1940. Кн. 1: Политическая история. М., 1998, С. 181–182.

[22] PA AA: Dienststelle Ribbentrop. Vertrauliche Mitarbeiterberichte II, 5/1 Teil 2 (R 27122), Bl. 59626–59627.

[23] Троцкий Л.Д. Преступления Сталина, С. 139–140.

[24] Там же.

[25] Троцкий Л.Д. Дневники и письма, С. 193–194.

[26] Там же, с. 194.

[27] См.: PA AA: Büro des Staatssekretär. Der Krieg 1939. Bd. 7 (R 29689); Auswärtiges Amt, Weißbuch Nr. 6: Die Geheimakten des französischen Generalstabes. B., 1941; Kahle G. Das Kaukasusprojekt der Alliierten vom Jahre 1940. Opladen, 1973; Lorbeer H.-J. Westmächte gegen die Sowjetunion 1939–1941. Freiburg i. Br., 1975, S. 51 ff.; Орлов А.С. Странности «странной войны». – Новая и новейшая история, 1989, № 5, С. 78–79; Безыменский Л.А. Великая Отечественная в… 1940 году? – Международная жизнь, 1990, № 8, С. 103–116.

[28] PA AA: Pol. I M. Geheim. Agenten- und Spionagewesen: Nachrichten. Bd. 7
(R 102039), Bl. ohne Nummer (Deutsches Konsulat Genf an das AA, K Nr. 61 vom 4. Januar 1940).

[29] Auswärtiges Amt, Weißbuch Nr. 6: Die Geheimakten des französischen Generalstabes, S. 52.

[30] Quatrième Internationale, 1972, № 4, р. 27; Цит. по: Басманов М.И. В обозе реакции: Троцкизм 30–70-х годов. М., 1979, С. 71.

[31] PA AA: Botschaft Moskau. Geheim. Geheime politische Akten. Bd. 1, Bl. 175707–175708.

[32] См.: Ботмер К. фон. С графом Мирбахом в Москве: Дневниковые записи и документы за период с 19 апреля по 24 августа 1918 г. Пер. с нем. М., 1996, С. 74.

[33] См.: PA AA: Botschaft Moskau. 225. Attentat auf Botschaftsrat von Twardowski am 5. Marz 1932.

[34] Внешняя политика СССР. Т. IV. М., 1946, док. №409. Английский и французский послы выехали из Москвы еще в январе 1940 г. и речи об их возвращении либо назначении новых послов Лондон и Париж даже не вели.

[35] Auswärtiges Amt, Weißbuch Nr.6: Die Geheimakten des französischen Generalstabes, S. 65.

[36] Ibid., S. 91.

[37] Троцкий Л.Д. Дневники и письма, С. 175–177.

[38] См.: Волкогонов Д.А. Троцкий: Политический портрет. Кн. 2, С. 335.

[39] Manifesto of the Fourth International on the imperialist war and proletarian revolution. New York, 1940. Р. 38. Цит. по: Басманов М.И. Указ. соч., С. 71.

[40] См.: Волкогонов Д. А. Троцкий: Политический портрет. Кн. 2, С. 133 и сл.

[41] PA AA: Büro des Staatssekretär. Finnland, Bd. 2 (R 29579), Bl. 009 (B003508); Unterstaatssekretär. Sowjetunion, Bd. 2 (R 29912), Bl. 23693; Handakten Etzdorf. Vertr. AA beim OKH. Abwehr-Länder (III) (R 27374), Bl. 66154–66154/1.

[42] Сиполс В. Я. Миссия Криппса в 1940 г.: Беседа со Сталиным. – Новая и новейшая история, 1992, № 5, С. 23–40.

[43] См. прим. 18.

[44] См.: Хилл Дж. Моя шпионская жизнь. Пер. с англ. М., 2000.