I hope it is abundantly clear — all these roundabout ways to do with the volunteers for contract service might be connected with the Russian government’s fears that carrying out a new mobilization might cause less positive sentiments among the general population.
That is why the word “mobilization” is seems to be put on the back burner. In this regard, as the saying goes— ‘in the house of a hanged man there is no talk of rope’.
Yet, at the front there appears to be sharp decline in the number of human resources of the Russian troops due to the losses inflicted. And due to the reduction in the size of our troops to some extent, this process might only be accelerating and runs the risk of possibly becoming critical.
Though the Kremlin needs to somehow hold out for the 2024 presidential elections, possibly elect Vladimir Putin again to preserve the overall security in the country and only then will it possibly resort to the mobilization. Until then, there is little chance it will happen.
And that may well be the reason behind the somewhat abrupt plans being implemented to solve the problem of reducing numbers among the volunteers for contract service, among those who tend to decline to restrict the terms and conditions of participation in hostilities for those who were mobilized last autumn.
This might be a reason why the higher government and military officials appear to avoid rotating military personnel at the frontlines. This is why there seems to be an issue with the military regular holiday entitlements.
The authorities seem to be well aware that military personnel returning from the front on leave appear to act as ‘propagandists and agitators’, voicing their concern as to what they view as the “truth from the trenches” about what is happening in this mindboggling war. Moreover, this truth might as well be communicated by the number of funerals. And this truth cannot be embellished by those who might have a different view.
And this might be used and abused by endless SOROS funded, the fifth Column NGOs of all sorts within Russia and mostly in Moscow, regrettably though and further afield to stir protests and provoke further discontent and all manner of Orange Revolutions within Russia which might lead to a significant increase in anti-war sentiment in the Russiansociety, which might ultimately pose some threat of a new less pleasant Brest Peace.
And in such a scenario, what seems to some as ‘inflated ratings’ will not do much good. A bleak parallel might be established with the circumstances of Nicholas II in February 1917.
At this point in time, Vladimir Putin might find himself between a rock and a hard place — mobilization will possibly have to be carried out yet it cannot be. The Russian government together with the Russian President Vladimir Putin hope to keep the situation under control until March 2024. Will they succeed? One cannot tell.
But if this mindboggling war continues and the president continues to rely solely on the “Surovikin Line,” then a new time of troubles in Russia may be approaching soon. A repetition of the February 1917 scenario might be the aftermath of this all.
And with all this in mind, I remain a staunch supporter of a new mobilization. At any cost. Without it, we are doomed to lose this war. The alternative to this is capitulation and Russia’s loss of statehood and sovereignty.